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Abstract 
Comparing economy to religion is a fairly common phenomenon when used as a rhetorical 
tool, but can it also be used analytically? This thesis is based on a sociological reading of 
three books by Robert Nelson, who defines the field of economics as a set of theologies for 
secular religions in modern society. Using the phenomenological sociology of Thomas 
Luckmann, it seeks to expand on the ideas of Nelson and identify their sociological utility. It 
finds that understanding economy as religion gives valuable insight into the relationships of 
science, ideology and morality to economy. It provides an outside perspective on economy in 
a world where subjective economic definitions of reality are accepted in the mainstream as 
objective truth. 
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Preface 
This thesis has come from a long process of exploring the concept of economy as religion 
through the writings of American economist Robert Nelson, the sociology of Thomas 
Luckmann and many other sources. Beginning in spring of 2013, I came to know of Nelson’s 
books, and started researching the subject and looking for others who have used the same 
perspective. I was baffled by two things: first, the sheer amount of material I found which 
referred in some way or another to the comparison between economy to religion. Second, I 
was stunned by the lack of thorough analysis of the idea outside of Nelson’s work. It is a 
surprisingly common idea, thrown around in public debate and in political books of many 
sorts. I stumbled upon newspaper articles that used the comparison several times when I was 
not even looking for it. However, social science seems to be dismissing it as a purely 
rhetorical phenomenon, of no sociological interest. 
I was intrigued to find out more, as I had always been interested in the sociology of religion as 
a favorite sociological field. I thought of Berger and Luckmann’s sociology of knowledge and 
Luckmann’s The Invisible Religion, and figured that from that theoretical perspective, this 
would surely be an interesting phenomenon to explore. In the autumn of 2013, I did a 
semester abroad, studying at the University of California, Berkeley, and I resolved to spend 
my time there trying to learn more about economy as religion. The libraries there proved 
immensely valuable, as I gained access to a much more extensive array of books than what I 
would have had available at NTNU. I found other authors who wrote about economy as 
religion, but while their insights were fascinating, they were few and far between, and none of 
them could come close to Robert Nelson when it came to meticulous analysis and lengthy 
discussion of the concept. 
The professors at Berkeley were also very valuable to my project. I was allowed to use my 
papers as training for my planned master’s thesis. For a course in the sociology of economics, 
I would explore the variations of usage of the concept, from the most superficial rhetorical 
use, via politically motivated critical use to the distanced and analytical academic use. For a 
course in the sociology of development, I would use the concept as an entrance to 
developmental policies, looking at the "missionary" economic policies of the Washington 
Consensus and global neoliberal religion. For a course on America in a comparative 
perspective, I looked at how American economy differed from Scandinavian economy, when 
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you looked at the two as different forms of economic religions. Thus I was given valuable 
experience in thinking about economy as religion and writing about it academically. I also 
learned the valuable lesson that when writing about unfamiliar and slightly controversial 
issues, some academics will appreciate it more than others. Those of a more conservative 
nature, who might not see the value of the work, may dismiss it, while others praise it. This is 
a phenomenon which absolutely transcended  geographical borders, and I experienced it even 
more back home in Norway. In my experience, Nelson is very right when he says that those 
who are most involved in economics themselves, have a much harder time grasping the idea 
of economics as religion, or at least of accepting it as accurate or as analytically useful 
(Nelson 2001:79n). 
Starting the work on my thesis, I initially went in a direction which did not prove fruitful. I 
attempted to explore the concept by looking at one specific economic religion, namely 
neoliberalism. Having read a lot of critical literature which used religious comparison to 
depict the spread and the characteristics of neoliberal economy, I wanted to try to use the 
analytical insights from Nelson and others to see how it could work together with the different 
types of less analytical and more rhetorical uses of the concept. I also wanted to spotlight 
Norway, and look at how political history could show how this neoliberal religion has 
influenced Norwegian economy gradually more and more. This version of my thesis turned 
out to be a too superficial and too broad of an endeavor. The present version is a return to the 
core of the original idea that I had of exploring the thinking of Robert Nelson more 
specifically, using the theoretical apparatus of the sociology of knowledge and perspective on 
religion which I have learned from Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann. This has given me 
the opportunity to delve much deeper into the questions of the theory of knowledge raised by 
sociology, and to immerse myself more into Nelson’s writing than I would have been able to 
in a project with many different voices.  
In this thesis, I have focused initially on Luckmann and Nelson, but I have also used a lot of 
other sources in the discussion that springs from my engagement with these two. The 
theoretical part is intended as a foundation on which to understand Nelson in the analysis. I 
mainly use Luckmann’s The Invisible Religion, but also explore the tradition of thought which 
this book springs out of, which means that I also lean on The Social Construction of Reality 
by Berger and Luckmann. In the main analytical part, I deal with Nelson’s three books, with 
the bulk of the analysis focusing on the middle book, Economics as Religion. The two other 
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books are used as supplements, but the most important theoretical ideas can be found in 
Economics as Religion, so this is where I have chosen to draw the most from. 
Applying the sociological framework of thinking and understanding to Nelson’s work, which 
is written as a theological analysis of economic history has been almost surprisingly easy. 
Even though Nelson is an economist himself, and has almost no sociological references in his 
books, the project itself is full of what one might call “sociological imagination”. A lot of the 
questions he raises are highly sociologically relevant, and fit into a sociological frame of 
reference. However, I do think that sociology has something to add to Nelson’s work. A lot of 
the theoretical perspectives which I apply to Nelson through Luckmann are in my opinion 
illuminating, and make the concept more understandable and theoretically sound. 
Thank you 
I would like to extend my deepest gratitude to Professor Emeritus Gustav Erik G. Karlsaune, 
who not only inspired my interest in the sociology of religion several years ago, but also 
helped me immensely with the writing process for this thesis. 
I would like to thank Professor Bente Rasmussen for supervising the project. 
I would like to thank Ingvill Stuvøy for helpful comments. 
I would also like to thank Peter Sohlberg and Lars Mjøset for brutal but constructive criticism 
of an earlier version of the thesis. 
Finally, I would like to thank Borghild Bråtveit for never-ending support and encouragement. 
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1 Introduction 
Faith is what makes an economy exist. Without faith, it is only plastic cards and paper money  
(Parker 2009).  
 
This is a quote from Kyle Broflovski, a character in the animated satirical sitcom South Park. 
It is a line from an episode that was meant as a commentary on the then very current 
economic crisis in the US, and it contains an intriguing hint at a comparison between religion 
and economy. While the comparison in this case seems to be meant as nothing more than a 
provocative and amusing observation, the comparison itself is a fairly common phenomenon 
in both popular culture and in political debate. 
As a rhetorical instrument, comparisons between economy and religion are quite popular even 
among famous economists in current debate. The prominent economists Joseph Stiglitz and 
Paul Krugman are examples of frequent users. In a recent lecture, Stiglitz (2013) claimed that 
“a lot of what is called economics is not economics. It is more like ideology; a religion”. 
Krugman refers to a lack of scientific accuracy in economics when he asserts that “money is 
indeed kind of a theological issue”, and that “When faith – including faith-based economics – 
meets evidence, evidence doesn’t stand a chance” (Krugman 2014). 
This type of comparison is far from a modern phenomenon. Already in 1921, Walter 
Benjamin (2005), a German Marxist from the Frankfurter School, wrote that  
One can behold in capitalism a religion, that is to say, capitalism essentially serves to justify the same 
worries, anguish, and disquiet formerly answered by so-called religion. The proof of capitalism’s 
religious structure – as not only a religiously conditioned construction, as Weber thought, but as an 
essentially religious phenomenon – still today misleads one to a boundless, universal polemic. We 
cannot draw close the net in which we stand. A commanding view will, however, later become possible. 
1.1 Problem 
These four quotes serve as a quick introduction to the theme of this thesis, which is the 
comparison between economy and religion. However, they represent widely different 
perspectives on that theme. From the quirky observation made in jest in order to entertain, via 
the politically motivated rhetoric meant as a convincing argument, to the analytic definition of 
commonalities. For the purposes of this thesis, the latter is the most fruitful as an entrance to 
discussion. Walter Benjamin could not “draw close the net” nearly a century ago, but perhaps 
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we have come closer today to being able to achieve something closer to “a commanding 
view”? 
Analyzing comparisons between economy and religion is an ambiguous project to say the 
least. All of the concepts involved can mean several different things, and it is of great 
importance to clarify what is meant by each of them. The quotes I have used in the 
introduction all have different meanings implied, and can be interpreted for example in the 
following manner: 
First, the South Park quote talks about “economy”, presumably meaning the entire institution 
of human exchange as a whole, including goods, services, labor, land and money. Stiglitz 
talks about “economics”, which is probably meant as referring to the academic field dealing 
with the more or less scientific knowledge about that system of markets and exchange. This 
divide between the often interchangeable words economy and economics will be important in 
this thesis. I will refer to economy as the whole social phenomenon of human exchange, and 
economics as the institutionalized academic field of expert knowledge about that 
phenomenon. Krugman also talks about “economics”, but he additionally singles out “money” 
as a phenomenon which he describes as theological. Finally, Benjamin talks about 
“capitalism”, which is a specific economic category of how to organize a society politically. 
Thus, we have several different versions of the “economy”-side of the comparison.  
The “religion”-side is at least as difficult to pin down. In the quote from South Park, they 
simply talk about “faith”. While this word certainly is associated with religion, it is absolutely 
not the same as religion. Stiglitz mentions both “ideology” and “religion”. The differences 
between these two concepts are also important. Krugman talks about “theology”, which has a 
similar relationship to “religion” as what “economics” has to the “economy”, meaning that it 
refers to a body of expert knowledge of that field. 
The nature of the comparisons is a third and important issue in the comparison between 
economy and religion. In the South Park quote, the economy is dependent on faith, which 
implies a different relationship between the two concepts than what for example Benjamin 
implies when he refers to religion as something which can be seen in capitalism. Stiglitz says 
that economics is religion implying yet another form of relationship or comparison. I am 
interested in theoretically based comparison, specifically meaning that I want to analyze the 
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categorization of economic phenomena as religious. I am less interested in analogies and 
metaphors, though these also represent important contributions to my discussion. 
This establishes the main problem of this thesis, which is the comparison of economy and 
religion. As I have shown, there are a host of theoretical questions springing out from this 
comparison. As a sociologist, my main interest will be in the social relevance of such a 
comparison. Thus, my research question in this thesis is: what is the sociological utility of a 
comparison between economy and religion? 
1.2 Material 
From the widely different comparisons quoted in this introduction, it is obvious that in order 
to gain any insight from the comparison, we have to be clear about the concepts that are being 
used. Therefore, I have chosen to narrow my analysis down to one specific main author, 
which has written extensively on the comparison of economy and religion. Robert Nelson, an 
American economist, seems to me to be the one who has come closest to avoiding the 
“boundless, universal polemic” that Benjamin warns us of. He has written three books where 
he systematically explores economics as what he calls a “secular religion”. In these books, 
connected and organized into a coherent reasoning, we avoid the confusions of the 
disconnected and seemingly theoretically unjustified or unexplained comparisons from the 
above examples. Nelson gives us a historical presentation of the field of economics, 
comparing it to religion using clear definitions and solid knowledge of economics, theology 
and the history of ideas in the US and the western world.  
In short, Nelson’s argument is that the role economics has defined for itself in society does 
not correspond with its self-description as a value-neutral science. He claims that instead, it 
provides a whole cosmos of meaning, with moral frameworks and guidelines for human lives 
and societies. These are social functions which in the past were filled by religious institutions 
and religious philosophies. Using a functional definition, Nelson therefore argues that 
economic ideologies have become modern “secular” religions, complete with intricate 
theologies and hierarchies of ultimate meaning. 
1.3 Perspective 
While Nelson is an economist, and writes from that academic point of view, I am a 
sociologist, and consequently, I have other frames of reference in my thinking and other 
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interests at heart with my analysis than him. While he is interested in the economic ideas 
themselves and the nature of the academic field, I look at both economy and religion as social 
phenomena. This separates my perspective from that of for example an economist or a 
theologian. It separates me from Nelson specifically in that I am interested in the economy, 
while he explicitly focuses on economics. Understanding and explaining the social nature of 
economy and religion is the foundation of my analysis. In order to do this, I will present and 
use the phenomenological thinking of Thomas Luckmann’s sociology of knowledge as a 
theoretical perspective. I will show how this form of sociology allows me to identify the 
dialectical relationship between the objective and the subjective in social reality, and how this 
proves to be a useful way of thinking about the comparison of economy and religion. 
The quote from Benjamin contains an important link to the sociological frame of mind which 
is important to the perspective of this thesis. He mentions Max Weber, and his vision of 
capitalism as a “religiously conditioned construction”, referring of course to Weber’s 
sociological masterpiece The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. It is close to 
impossible to underestimate Weber’s importance, both to sociology generally, but especially 
when it comes to economic and religious issues. The aforementioned book contains what I 
personally think is an extremely useful and insightful sociological description of the 
economy: “The capitalistic economy of the present is an immense cosmos into which the 
individual is born, and which presents itself to him as an unalterable order of things” (Weber 
1976:54). This quote embodies a lot of what this thesis is about, and it connects logically and 
naturally to my main theoretical foundation. 
Central to the meaning of this quote is the word cosmos. It is a word that relates to the 
phenomenological tradition in philosophy, and Weber’s use of it here seems to correspond with 
the concept of the “life-world” or Lebenswelt which we get from Edmund Husserl (Fuglseth 
2012:217). Alfred Schütz was responsible for transferring this idea to social science, and there it 
has arguably been best explained by his two students Luckmann and Berger. A Cosmos can be 
understood as the world as it is perceived by the individual. This is a central idea of the 
phenomenological tradition, and also seems to be what Weber means in the quote above. 
The next important thing in the quote is the phrase an unalterable order of things. What Berger 
and Luckmann so brilliantly explain in The Social Construction of Reality is how individual 
conceptions of the cosmos, our understanding of the world seen through our eyes, is felt to be 
objective and given. The world is shaped by humans, and we collectively decide how we organize 
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society, but to a large degree, we nevertheless experience society as something unalterable. Berger 
and Luckmann explain this through concepts like objectifying and reifying, which we will return 
to in more detail later. 
Going back to what Weber says once more, what is it that he describes as an unalterable and 
immense cosmos? It is the capitalistic economy of the present. The economy, which presently 
happens to be capitalistic, is described as something which presents itself as an order of things in 
which the individual must live. The lives of individuals are shaped by the present form of the 
economy, and individuals have to adapt their lives to what they see as the objective organization 
of economic issues. Simply put, this is just how things are. The reality-defining position this puts 
the economy in, is an important part of what leads us to the idea that economy can be viewed as a 
religion, using the definitions and understandings that will be elaborated on in this text. 
1.4 Layout 
In sum, the problem I will be exploring in this thesis is the comparison between economy and 
religion. I will do this by focusing mainly on Robert Nelson's extensive analysis of this 
comparison. While the material I analyze thus is textual, my interest lies in the ideas behind 
Nelson’s books and their value of for sociological theory. The perspective I use to understand 
these thoughts and evaluate them as sociological knowledge and theory, is the tradition of 
sociology based on phenomenology as the scientific paradigm represented by Thomas 
Luckmann. This text should therefore be considered as a theoretical research project in the 
sociology of knowledge, rather than a part of the “sub-disciplines” sociology of economics or 
sociology of religion. 
In the thesis, I will start by presenting my theoretical apparatus and way of thinking. The 
definitions of the main components of my research questions will be central to this part. The 
analysis part of the thesis will look at Nelson’s thinking in depth, and will focus on outlining 
the important points of his reasoning as well as grasping the sociological value to be found 
within it. The final parts of the thesis will be a discussion of possible ways forward, and here I 
will draw on other authors to a greater extent than in the preceding parts, where my focus will 
mostly remain on Luckmann and Nelson. 
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2 Theory 
2.1 Classic Influences 
Thomas Luckmann has inherited important ideas about religion from both Weber and other 
classics in the field of sociology. He asserts that  
the general problem of the relation of the individual to the social order and the specific articulation of 
this problem in modern society were recognized as “religious” by Weber as well as Durkheim and (…) 
consequently, a theory of religion occupied a prominent place in their sociological work (Luckmann 
1967:77).  
In fact, both Weber and Durkheim “sought the key to an understanding of the social location 
of the individual in the study of religion” (ibid:12). It seems that Luckmann already in the 
60’s was disgruntled with how sociology as a whole had diverted from this focus on religion 
as a central concept. My own experience of the field is also that religion has been given a very 
minor role in modern sociology. 
Weber’s purpose in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism was to outline the 
important influences that religion has had on the evolution of economic ideology. This is an 
analytical insight which is an important inspiration for the present text. Weber argued that in a 
modern rationalizing society, some forms of religiosity promotes capitalism more than others. 
He saw the protestant variety of ethics as a good basis for the capitalist spirit to grow from 
because of the way they valued both asceticism and the idea of increasing profits. The 
Protestant ethic combined austerity as an ideal with the interpretation of wealth as a divine 
sign of righteousness, and as a confirmation of predestination to heaven. The “spirit” of 
capitalism in Weber’s thinking operated as an “ethically coloured maxim for the conduct of 
life” (Weber 1976:51-52) 
Weber (1963:1) was famously reluctant to provide any clear definition of religion, but can be 
said to have operated with a substantive definition, relating to the ethical content of religion 
(Davie 2007:29) This leads me to one of the biggest debates within the sociology of religion, 
which is that of substantive and functional definitions. A substantive definition is related to 
the actual content or the object of belief, normally a supernatural entity of some sort. 
 8 
 
 
Functional definitions, on the other hand, define religion by how it works to fulfill a social or 
individual need, for example integration or deeper meaning (ibid:19). 
Émile Durkheim provides a famous definition of religion, which does not easily fit within 
either one of the two categories. In The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, Durkheim 
(1968:62) describes religion as “A unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred 
things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden – beliefs and practices which unite into 
one single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to them”. We can 
recognize both the substantial and the functional in this definition. The sacred can be said to 
be the central substantive element, while the uniting or integrative capacity of religion is the 
functional element of his definition. 
2.2 The Social Construction of Reality 
As mentioned, Luckmann is indebted to both Weber and Durkheim. In fact, in The Social 
Construction of Reality, Berger and Luckmann (1991:28-29) briefly describe their 
relationship to the classics thus:  
Our view of the nature of social reality is greatly indebted to Durkheim and his school of French 
Sociology, though we have modified the Durkheimian theory of society by the introduction of a 
dialectical perspective derived from Marx and an emphasis on the constitution of social reality through 
subjective meanings derived from Weber.  
The dialectical perspective that they draw from Marx’s thinking is further elaborated in The 
Invisible Religion: “The world view stands in a dialectic relationship with the social structure” 
(Luckmann 1967:54). This sentence can be said to sum up a lot of Berger and Luckmann’s 
thinking, and I will now elaborate on this before returning to the theme of religion. 
Alfred Schütz taught Berger and Luckmann that both the everyday and the scientific 
understandings of the world is built by constructing perspectives out of abstractions, 
generalizations, formalizations and idealizations (Schütz 1962:5). The human being is 
fundamentally a socially creative being, according to The Social Construction of Reality. 
People create society in a social process of externalization: “Social order is not part of the 
‘nature of things’, and it cannot be derived from the ‘laws of nature’. Social order exists only 
as a product of human activity” (Berger and Luckmann 1991:70). By externalizing themselves 
into a social order of creative cooperation, individuals bring about society. But if individuals 
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create society, what creates individuals? This is where Berger and Luckmann’s dialectical 
perspective is useful. Human beings shape society according to their individual world-views, 
their cosmos. At the same time, one could say that the individual person individuates the 
collective consciousness of society (Luckmann 2004:8), meaning that his or her cosmos is 
made through social interaction, giving them world views that correspond with that of a social 
community. “The world view is an encompassing system of meaning in which socially 
relevant categories of time, space, causality and purpose are superordinated to more specific 
interpretive schemes in which reality is segmented and the segments related to one another” 
(Luckmann 1967:53). And this individual perspective on how the world is and how it should 
be is shaped by internalizing social norms through socialization. Together, this forms a 
dialectic relationship between externalization and internalization.  
A third process is also central to Berger and Luckmann’s reasoning. That is the concept of 
objectivation, the process by which the subjectively created structures of society comes to be 
understood as objectively fixed and determined. The dialectic relationship between 
individuals and society, between world view and social structure, is often hidden from the 
individuals in question, because the social order appears to be derived from the “laws of 
nature”, despite the fact that it is always a “product of human activity”. The truth, however, is 
that “laws of nature” fail completely at describing the social activities of human societies. The 
“circle” of externalization, objectivation and internalization can be summed up in three central 
sentences from The Social Construction of Reality: “Society is a human product. Society is an 
objective reality. Man is a social product” (Berger and Luckmann 1991:79). Through these 
processes, we can see how a cosmos of meaning, or a life-world, can be socially created, 
constructed into a seemingly objective inevitability, and then internalized with new people 
through processes of socialization, so that they experience reality as set and unchangeable, 
even as they are part of changing it themselves. This is because it has been legitimized to the 
degree that it appears to be “self-evident” to the individuals.  
Seeing institutions in society through the lens provided by Berger and Luckmann’s 
understanding of the social construction of reality is helpful when seeking to understand 
traditional as well as secular religion. Both the profound impact of religion on societies and 
lives and the firmness of people’s religious belief can be grasped through this theory. In an 
analysis of economy as religion, the theoretical backdrop of social constructivism plays the 
same role as in analysis of traditional religion. Peter Berger explains in The Sacred Canopy 
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(1969:35-36) that “Religious legitimation purports to relate the humanly defined reality to 
ultimate, universal and sacred reality. The inherently precarious and transitory constructions 
of human activity are thus given the semblance of ultimate security and permanence”. The 
religious cosmos thus becomes internalized, legitimized and objectified until it seems to be 
the most natural of things to the individual. This explais how the theology of a religion can 
become objectified to the point of reification, where it is viewed as nothing short of a natural 
order or an objective law. The concept of reification is explained by Berger and Luckmann as 
“the apprehension of human phenomena as if they were things, that is, in non-human or 
possibly supra-human terms (…). Reification implies that man is capable of forgetting his 
own authorship of the human world” (Berger and Luckmann 1991:106). One of the common 
features of traditional religion and economic religion is that scientific falsification seems to 
have no impact on the believers’ faith in the truth content, because they are so sure that their 
understanding of the world is correct that they cannot be convinced otherwise. I see it as a 
sociological task to understand this failure to take reality into account, and reification is a 
useful concept to explain how it happens. With this perspective clear in our minds, Weber’s 
assertion that the economy constitutes a complete cosmos which to the individuals appear to 
be unchangeable seems to be a logical consequence.  
2.3 Religion 
So far, these ideas should be easy to accept for most sociologists. I have shown how Weber’s 
thinking concerning the social importance of economic ethics ties in with Berger and 
Luckmann’s basic reasoning of a socially constructed and objective, reality. The following 
ideas, though, might be more controversial. I am going to use the reasoning from Luckmann’s 
The Invisible Religion to arrive at Robert Nelson’s thesis which explains economics as 
fundamentally religious. Neither Luckmann nor Weber has suggested that they understand 
economy in this way, but I am not attempting to take their names in vain or twist their words. 
What I am trying to do is to explain how Luckmann provides a well thought-out and fitting 
sociological foundation for understanding Nelson’s proposition. To do this, I will have to go 
through the main ideas in The Invisible Religion in some detail, starting with what I have 
already briefly touched upon, the definition of religion. 
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2.3.1 Transcendence 
Luckmann bases his definition of religion on the anthropological condition of transcendence. 
His use of this concept is closely related to the thinking of The Social Construction of Reality. 
In the process of internalization and externalization, the human organism “becomes a Self by 
embarking with others upon the construction of an “objective” and moral universe of 
meaning. Thereby the organism transcends its biological nature” (Luckmann 1967:49). 
Through transcendence, the human organism is not bound to its immediate physical 
environment. The subjectively active and social human can imagine and communicate ideas 
beyond the time and space it occupies. 
The concept of transcendence is an absolutely essential part of Luckmann’s sociology. 
Derived from Husserls phenomenological philosophy and his term “appresentation”, meaning 
something which cannot be immediately experienced, made present by something which can 
be immediately experienced (Luckmann 2004:149), it is used in different levels of 
transcending the borders outlined by the life-world of individuals. Small transcendences 
consist of logical assumptions that we make every minute of every day, such as assuming that 
the other side of a ball has the same round shape or the same color as what the in-view side 
gives us an indication for. Medium-sized transcendences are related to our interaction with 
fellow human beings, such as when we communicate and feel that we can understand each 
other, even though it is naturally impossible for us to know what the other person is really 
thinking (ibid:143-144). The big transcendences are those that deal with another reality 
altogether. Utopias, dreams, or conceptions of heaven fall in under this description. Ritual 
actions of religious significance are directed towards a transcendent reality outside of the 
everyday. These actions would be meaningless within the framework of the actions and 
conversations of the everyday (ibid:152). 
2.3.2 The Sacred 
Luckmann uses the concepts of sacred and profane when talking about religion. This is 
something he has in common with Durkheim and many other theorists of religion. In 
Luckmann’s thinking, the profane is connected to everyday life, while the sacred is connected 
to the transcendent domain. “Both the ultimate significance of everyday life and the meaning 
of extraordinary experiences are located in this ‘different’ and ‘sacred’ domain of reality” 
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(Luckmann 1967:58). In other words, the sacred gives meaning to both normal everyday life 
and to transcendent visions of religious character. 
Conceptions of the sacred are learned through social processes, just like every other part of 
our life-worlds. But what sets a “sacred” religious cosmos apart from our everyday 
understanding of the world? “Within the world view a domain of meaning can become 
articulated that deserves to be called religious. This domain consists of traits which represent 
an essential “structural” trait of the world view as a whole – to wit, its inner hierarchy of 
significance” (ibid:56). The defining characteristic of religious world views compared with 
everyday world views is in other words that the religious places everything into a “hierarchy 
of significance”. This is what gives the transcendent domain an authoritative “ultimate 
significance” over other domains of reality. 
While Luckmann never provides us with a clear one-sentence definition of religion, we can 
grasp the core of what he means by the term from the explanations above. It is a dominant 
world view, related to a sacred plane of transcendence. A religious cosmos can also be 
described as a “symbolic universe” in Luckmann’s terminology. “Symbolic universes are 
objectivated meaning-systems that relate the experiences of everyday life to a “transcendent” 
layer of reality. Other systems of meaning do not point beyond the world of everyday life; that 
is, they do not contain a “transcendent” reference” (ibid:44). In the notes to The Social 
Construction of Reality, we can read that “Our concept of ‘symbolic universe’ is very close to 
Durkheim’s ‘religion’. Schutz’s analysis of ‘finite provinces of meaning’ and their 
relationship to each other, and Sartre’s concept of ‘totalization’ have been very relevant for 
our argument at this point” (Berger and Luckmann 1991:226). 
The socialization of a human organism is the process in which transcendence is achieved, and 
can therefore be called fundamentally religious. In the course of socialization, we are given a 
hierarchy of significance which guides our lives.  
Individual existence derives its meaning from a transcendent world view (…) The world view is an 
encompassing system of meaning in which socially relevant categories of time, space, causality and 
purpose are superordinated to more specific interpretive schemes in which reality is segmented and the 
segments related to one another. In other words, it contains a “natural” logic as well as a “natural” 
taxonomy (Luckmann 1967:52-53). 
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Luckmann’s understanding of religion is based on the conditions of human nature, and the 
ability of our consciousness to transcend objective reality. Human subjectivity creates a 
sacred symbolic universe which allows us to act according to a vision of a transcendent realm. 
Over time, we transfer our symbolic universes across generations and geographic boundaries 
until we have a more or less common set of socially created understandings of the sacred. 
“The individuation of consciousness and conscience of historical individuals is objectively 
determined by historical religions in one of their social forms” (ibid:69). 
Going as deep as Luckmann does in exploring the roots and foundations of religion 
necessarily means to deviate from the standard toolbox of sociological concepts, and moving 
into the field of “philosophical anthropology” (ibid:44). But it is necessary to make this leap 
to fully grasp the social nature of religion, and its position in the dialectical relationship 
between subjective and objective reality. It also helps us in building a model of how religion 
can empirically unfold in society. As religious messages are passed on, it will create 
differentiation of roles, in the form of a priesthood which holds the sacred knowledge of the 
theology, and a congregation which believes and follows the tenets of the religion, but does 
not have the same access to its deepest secrets. Institutions will be formed out of this 
differentiation, containing their own terminologies and physical manifestations. Ultimately, 
cultural and moral sentiments that follows from the religion’s teaching may seep into 
mainstream society and be widely accepted as objective reality. 
2.3.3 Nebulous Universality? 
Luckmann’s conception of religion, seen in the context of other definitions, places him within 
the category of “functional definition”. There is no substantive reference to any 
institutionalized form of religion, and religion has the clear function of providing ultimate 
significance and the hierarchical division of a sacred world view. It provides a life-world 
which is hierarchically superior to other interpretations of reality. Many have criticized the 
fact that this makes religion so wide a concept as to render it universal. If everyone is 
religious, and all kinds of transcendent systems of meaning can be defined as a religion, then 
what value is left in the word? Some claim that the functionalist approach “by embracing all 
systematized responses to ultimate questions on the meaning of life and death and one’s 
presence on earth, turns religion into a nebulous and indefinable entity” (Hervieu-Lèger 
2000:36). 
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Luckmann has the following to say on such criticism:  
It may be objected from a theological and “substantivist” position on religion that in this view religion 
becomes an all-encompassing phenomenon. We suggest that this is not a valid objection. The 
transcendence of biological nature is a universal phenomenon of mankind” (Luckmann 1967:49).  
In other words, Luckmann insists that the reason why religion becomes such a wide and 
universal concept is simply that this is the true nature of religion. He also criticizes 
substantive definitions of religion, saying that these arose as a result of specific historical 
circumstances, which led to a certain form of institutionalized church-religion being the 
dominant form of religion in the place and time of the definers. This renders such definitions 
ethnocentric and “of no value to sociology” (ibid:42). A functional definition avoids such 
ideological bias. According to Luckmann (ibid:43), “Religious institutions are not universal; 
the phenomena underlying religious institutions or, to put it differently, performing analogous 
functions in the relation of the individual and the social order presumably are universal” 
[italics added]. 
2.3.4 Luckmann’s Purpose 
As I mentioned, Luckmann does not write The Invisible Religion with any kind of conception 
of understanding economy as religion in mind. This is an idea which other people, such as 
Robert Nelson, propound. So what, then, is Luckmann’s intention with his book and his 
understanding of religion as something deeper and more universal than the institutionalized 
conception of “church-religion”? It is to understand and refute the popular theories of 
secularization which were prevalent in social science during the period in which The Invisible 
Religion was written. 
Secularization was understood at the time as the rapid, widespread and seemingly unstoppable 
decline of religion. Religion seemed to be losing power, influence and importance in public 
and private arenas all over the western world, and the development seemed to be going in 
only one direction. People were going less and less to church, professing less and less to 
believe in God and performing less and less of what can be defined as religious rites and 
customs (Davie 2007:46-65). While a lot of people at the time agreed that these phenomena of 
secularization were signs of the inevitable future demise of religion as an important social 
phenomenon, Luckmann strongly disagrees with such an interpretation in The Invisible 
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Religion. He argued instead that religion was not truly declining at all; it was simply 
changing. “What are usually taken as symptoms of the decline of traditional Christianity may 
be symptoms of a more revolutionary change: the replacement of the institutional 
specialization of religion by a new social form of religion” (Luckmann 1967:90-91). The 
decline in organized church-religion is not the same as decline in religiosity itself, and “the 
values originally underlying church religion were not institutional norms but norms lending 
significance to individual life in its totality” (ibid:39). Seeing religion as limited to an 
institutional frame is a misconception, because religion is something which frames individual 
outlooks on life in total, not a limited portion of it.  
The central sociological questions regarding religion thus becomes not why or how religion is 
declining, but which new expressions religion gets in its new forms. “What are the dominant 
values overarching contemporary culture? What is the social-structural basis of these values 
and what is their function in the life of contemporary man?” Luckmann insists that we must 
not trivialize secularization as the loss of religion, but rather ask “what it is that secularization 
has brought about in the way of a socially objectivated cosmos of meaning” (ibid:40).  
The tentative attempts at answering his own questions are fascinating, especially when 
considering Robert Nelson’s ideas of understanding economics as a form of modern religion.  
To an immeasurably higher degree than in a traditional social order, the individual is left to his own 
devices in choosing goods and services, friends, marriage partners, neighbors, hobbies, and (…) even 
“ultimate” meanings in a relatively autonomous fashion. (…). The consumer orientation, in short, is not 
limited to economic products but characterizes the relation to the entire culture” (ibid:98).  
In modernity, religiosity has come to be defined as a private matter (ibid:94), while the 
“modern sacred cosmos symbolizes the social-historical phenomenon of individualism” 
(ibid:114). The private and the individual have become sacred. This dynamic of privatizing 
the previously institutionalized religious phenomenon of a hierarchized system of ultimate 
meaning is what produced the “invisible religion”. Religion has become something hidden 
and personal rather than something organized and coercive. Curiously, Luckmann never uses 
the term “invisible religion” in the book; it is simply a title given by the publishers, but it 
nevertheless neatly sums up the new form of “secularized” religion which Luckmann outlines.  
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In a lecture from 1989 called “Shrinking Transcendence, Expanding Religion”, Luckmann 
goes even further in outlining the secular takeover of social arenas that were previously 
dominated by traditional religion:  
As the traditional Christian salvational construction of the "great" transcendences ceased to infuse 
wide areas of everyday life with anything like coherent "ultimate" significance, certain values that 
originated in the context of political and economic action – i.e., in the domain of the "intermediate" 
transcendences – and, more specifically, in the sharpening class conflicts of the period, penetrated the 
increasingly more permeable universe of "transcendent" themes of the industrial societies” (Luckmann 
1990:131-132).  
The “secularization” of traditional religion, which gradually limited the social influence of the 
institutionalized incarnations of traditional religion, gave way to other transcendences which 
were allowed to grow and take over religious functions. The previous quotes relating to the 
economic consumer orientation of modern religion serves as a good start for our transition 
into Robert Nelson’s thinking. 
2.4 Secular Religion 
Having established a theoretical foundation for understanding religion as a social 
phenomenon, I will now move on to use this in exploring the material that this thesis will be 
based around. This material is the ideas of Robert Nelson, and I will approach these with the 
objective in mind that my research question states, identifying the sociological value of the 
comparison between economy and religion. Danièle Hervieu-Léger (2000:35), based on 
Luckmann’s definition of religion, states that “Nothing further should stand in the way of 
analysing, as religion in the full sense of the term, manifestations in which scholars 
empirically recognize a functional relationship with the dominant religions”. 
One of the key aspects of Luckmann’s theorizing when it comes to using The Invisible 
Religion to understand Robert Nelson’s ideas about economics as religion, is that Luckmann 
explicitly opens up for the possibility of a secular religion. He establishes that what is 
normally understood as religion, the traditional institutionalized social form of it, “occurs only 
under particular socio-historic circumstances” (Luckmann 1967:72). In other words, religion 
as it is normally understood is only a special variety of the phenomenon as it can potentially 
be expressed, and we can have many other expressions of it in society.  
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In his afterword from the German 1991-edition of The Invisible Religion, called “Nachtrag” 
or “Afterthoughts”, Luckmann (2004:154) posits that what characterizes the “segmented” 
modernity is that there is no longer a binding, reasonably universal and self-evident, socially 
constructed model of the reality which lies outside of the everyday. In my opinion, this might 
be where Nelson would disagree, and where I argue that if we take Nelson’s writings into 
account, economics can be seen to fill the void that Luckmann identifies. 
I will now try to show how Luckmann’s own thinking can identify economy as a symbolic 
universe with a transcendent reference, in other words a religion. Presenting and analyzing 
Nelson’s works on the concept, I will keep Luckmann’s ideas and theoretical insights in mind 
throughout the process, and I will keep asking the questions that Luckmann suggests one 
should be asking when researching religion.  
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3 Material 
To try to resolve the problems that Luckmann implies about the manifestation of religion in 
modernity, I am making use of the work of Robert H. Nelson. Nelson is an economist and a 
professor of Environmental Policy at the University of Maryland. He has worked in politics 
and written books on land and property rights, but is most known for his three books on 
economics as religion. These books have been published with intervals of roughly a decade: 
First, Reaching for Heaven on Earth – The Theological Meaning of Economics was published 
in 1991. Ten years later, in 2001, came Economics as Religion – From Samuelson to Chicago 
and Beyond. Finally, in 2010, he published The New Holy Wars – Economic Religion VS. 
Environmental Religion in Contemporary America. Additionally, he has written on the subject 
in several shorter articles. 
Despite the fact that his work is almost surprisingly devoid of any thorough discussions that 
utilize the theoretical apparatus of sociology, save for a few references to Max Weber and 
Robert Bellah, I find it to supply a lot of intriguingly fulfilling answers to exactly the kind of 
questions posed by Luckmann and other sociologists of religion. While there are certainly 
parts of his thinking and of the construction of his argument that can be criticized, most of it 
harmonizes with the theoretical apparatus which I have outlined. Since my interest lies in his 
ideas more than his expression of these, I will try to avoid the format of a book review, and 
rather try to use his ideas together with sociological theory. I have therefore chosen to place 
critical arguments against Nelson at the end of my discussion of his thinking. 
3.1 Identifying Economics as Religion 
First of all, Nelson uses a wide functional definition of religion, which is slightly different, 
but does not in my opinion conflict with Luckmann’s thinking in The Invisible Religion. He 
presents his definition in slightly different wordings over the three books, but the core is clear. 
Based on the theologian Paul Tillich, he uses the idea of “ultimate” values and understanding. 
Tillich has also been the inspiration of the broad definition of religion used in the American 
court system, where religion is understood as “an individual’s ‘ultimate concern’, to which all 
other concerns, including self-interest, are subordinate” (Nelson 2001:xxiv). Here, we can 
already note the similarities to Luckmann’s talk of a “hierarchy of significance”. Another way 
in which Nelson formulates the definition of religion is “a person’s way of framing his or her 
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basic perception of the world and its meaning” (Nelson 2010a:x), also here leaning on Tillich 
as a theological authority. This wording brings to mind Luckmann’s phenomenological 
approach and concepts such as “life-world”, “cosmos” and “symbolic universe”.  
Just as Luckmann does in The Invisible Religion, Nelson finds that a substantive definition of 
religion is not very helpful. Highlighting the functions of religion, for Nelson, “the term 
‘theology’ more precisely suggests a system of thought that is a source of fundamental 
meaning and purpose” (Nelson 1991:xxv). One could dwell on the fine differences between 
their definitions, but to me this would seem unnecessary and unproductive. I suppose Jose 
Casanova (1994:26) is right when he says that there is “no consensus, perhaps there will never 
be, as to what counts as religion”. Peter Berger, despite being critical of the functional 
definition of his colleague Luckmann, insists that definitions can be assessed only by their 
usefulness, and that they therefore must be a matter of taste, and only a “minor matter” at that 
(Berger 1969:175-177). 
Now, going back to a problem I raised already in the introduction: what is meant by 
economics? Since the economy is such a massive part of society, which takes shape in reality 
as both institutions, theories, ideologies and roles, placing an “=” between religion and 
economy makes little sense on its own. This is where Nelson truly proves his worth when 
compared to other, less comprehensive comparisons of economy and religion. Spread over 
more than a thousand pages, he explores the implications of his comparison at great length. 
Not only does he not generalize about economics; he effectively uses the perspective of 
seeing economics as a religion to write his own version of a history of modern economics, and 
systematically categorizes the different traditions and ideologies of economics into religious 
schisms. This means that effectively, economics is not a religion. Rather, it is a multitude of 
different religions. It should not be understood as a single philosophy at all, and Nelson 
spends much of his books exploring the dividing lines between different economic religions. 
3.2 The Market Paradox 
To explain this further, it is necessary to introduce one of the central concepts through which 
Nelson understands the nature of modern economics: the market paradox. In the easiest of 
terms, the market paradox is the problem of selfishness in the capitalist system. In order for 
the market to work, it is necessary that people act out of rational self-interest, and most 
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economic theories are based upon the assumption that they do so. But there must also be a 
limit to this self-interest, and without such a limit, the economy and society would collapse. 
The market paradox is the result of these two contradictory assumptions of the economy. In 
Nelson’s (ibid:268-269) own words: 
The market is based on the idea of individual pursuit of self-interest. At the same time, however, a 
market system will work best if there is a clear limit to self-interest. The pursuit of self-interest should 
not extend to various forms of opportunism, such as cheating, lying, and other types of deception, 
misrepresentation, and corruption within the marketplace (…). Another key consideration is that 
property rights, contracts, and other legal arrangements should be fairly and consistently enforced. In 
short, the market must exist within an institutional and civic-value context that transcends individual 
self-interest and supports and encourages actions that have a wider benefit for the common good (…). 
The development of a satisfactory constitutional framework and its enforcement thus may be critical to 
the effective functioning of a market system. Yet this may be a difficult requirement to meet. In some 
ways it depends on simultaneously encouraging and discouraging the expressions of self-interest. The 
demands placed on the normative system, religious or otherwise, that will sustain the market are thus 
rather precise. 
In these few sentences outlining the market paradox, Nelson defines one of the most central 
problems of economics regardless of which school one subscribes to. The posing of this 
problem is done without any necessary connection to “religious” economics. It is a fairly 
neutral problem, and Nelson’s method involves using this problem as a starting point for 
looking at different schools of economics, by looking at their different ways of “solving” the 
market paradox. What is more controversial and more specific to Nelson’s outlook is the 
assertion that the different solutions that have historically been applied to the market paradox, 
are religious (ibid:331). Already in the introduction to Economics as Religion, Nelson (ibid:6) 
suggests that 
One way of resolving this market paradox could be a religion with the following special tenets of belief. 
Whatever the theological grounds might be, one tenet of the religion should dictate strong approval of 
ordinary efforts to maximize business profits in the market. However, another tenet should impose a 
strong religious disapproval of the many other kinds of self-interested actions that might tend to 
undermine the workings of markets and to have other undesirable social consequences. 
He further elaborates on this throughout that book, and specifies that “It takes a special kind 
of religion to resolve the market paradox” (ibid:260), and that “One might say that the field of 
modern economics emerged as a secular religious answer to this problem” (ibid:280). Using 
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this logic, one might say that Weber’s identification of the Protestant ethic as a fruitful basis 
for the spirit of capitalism is based on Protestant ideology as a good incentive towards a 
balanced approach to the market paradox. As traditional religion has seemed to weaken its 
moral grip of the population, Nelson argues that economic religion has had to pick up the 
slack in order for the solution to the market paradox to be maintained. In Nelson’s historical 
walkthrough of different kinds of economic traditions, such as Samuelson’s progressivism 
and the neoliberalism of the Chicago school, he explicitly refers to ways these traditions 
handle the market paradox.  
3.3 Un-scientific Economists 
An important point about economic religions and religions generally is that they tend to trump 
scientific legitimacy. As the administrators of ultimate values, the economic religions are 
“making claims to truth” in order to change people’s ways of acting and believing (ibid:xviii). 
The religious nature of economics, in Nelson’s view, lets economists get away with 
unscientific endeavors in the name of science. Though the modern age has seen enormous 
growth and increases in human standards of living, Nelson (ibid:12) points out that “the main 
corpus of economic theory does a poor job of explaining all this economic growth and 
development”. In short, he claims that economists are not performing the scientifically based 
service that they claim they are doing. The religious ideologies which different schools of 
economics are based on, prevents them from doing “neutral” scientific work: “Economists are 
not neutral technicians who provide a tool for implementing values and basic beliefs supplied 
by others. They do not keep themselves separate from politics, confining their efforts to 
matters that can pass a strict scientific test” (Nelson 1991:xix). 
So what Nelson is asking is therefore: how can they claim scientific authority, when their 
“science” is actually religion? “If economics is not so much a matter of providing practical 
answers to well-defined problems, and instead seeks to provide the very framework for social 
thought, why should society pay close attention – as it often does – to the advice of 
economists?” (ibid:xx). The economists, the “priesthood” of this secular religion, has an 
immensely important role in establishing the authority of economics in society, and “science” 
is its main tool for doing so.  
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Luckmann claims in a general way about modern religion that the dominant ideologies utilize 
science as a rhetorical source of legitimacy (Luckmann 2004:139). The religious nature of 
economics makes it much less flexible than a “real” science. While science has to bend and 
transform when new evidence comes to light, economics is built on ideological doctrines, and 
the economists may actively oppose changes in the field. “The religious experts are 
professionally motivated to defend the status quo. They are also motivated to transmit 
successfully the ‘official’ model of religion to the laymen” (Luckmann 1967:83). 
Nelson sees this scientific disguise as an heirloom from the early years of social science. The 
positivistic attitudes have stuck to economics where it has faded in other social sciences, and 
so, “In claiming to wear the mantle of physics, modern economics in its early development 
was thus effectively asserting a religious authority” (Nelson 2001:281). The authority which 
this dynamic has bestowed upon the economist profession is quite staggering. “As the priests 
of this economic theology, economists today properly sit at the centers of power. They have 
no personal wealth, lands, empire, or military supporters to give them influence. Their 
influence is rather a moral authority – the power to dispense legitimacy in the contemporary 
welfare state” (Nelson 1991:8). For many, it seems the market has become a reified 
phenomenon in society. Markets are not always viewed as human constructions in economic 
theory, but are instead seen as fundamental and natural parts of the world. Just as the moon 
regulates the tides of the oceans, the market regulates the material wealth of humans. Markets 
are presumed not only to arise naturally and by themselves, but to be self-regulating systems 
that need no collective human intervention, just participation from individuals. Seeing 
economy as religion, we can understand markets as divinely justified: their reification is 
supported by religious faith in the innate rightness of capitalist reality. 
The paradox of positivism is glaring. Economics of different, and often conflicting ideological 
camps all seem to demand to be treated as value neutral science. While their positivistic 
attitudes imply that the economic science has no normative elements, and that it is based on 
verifiability and “hard facts”, critics are constantly pointing out that this is not the case. The 
most well-known example of the failure of economics in recent times is the financial crisis of 
the last half of a decade. Very few economists foresaw the collapse in the economy which has 
been economically crippling for people all around the world since it happened. The crisis does 
seem to have weakened the legitimacy of some economic ideologies at least in some parts of 
the population, but in others, it seems to have simply gained in strength. 
 24 
 
 
Alfred Schütz addresses the positivistic tendencies of economics in his article Common Sense 
and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action. He is critical of how economists seem to 
completely ignore the subjective side of social life, and focus only on their own “rational” 
constructs.  
Is it not the "behavior of prices" rather than the behavior of men in the market situation which is 
studied by the economist, the "shape of demand curves" rather than the anticipations of economic 
subjects symbolized by curves? Does not the economist investigate successfully subject matters such as 
"savings," "capital," "business cycle," "wages" and "unemployment," "multipliers" and "monopoly" as 
if these phenomena were entirely detached from any activity of the economic subjects, even less without 
entering into the subjective meaning structure such activities may have for them? (Schütz 1962:34) 
The dialectic between subjective and objective reality is lost completely, when the subjective 
meaning behind social action is not understood or discussed. Treating economics as purely 
objective will necessarily be a mistake as long as it is composed out of subjective individuals. 
The resistance to falsification that the economic profession and ideology is showing can be 
explained in many different ways. Defining it as religious is only one of these. One can also 
refer to the tenacity of what Marx called a hegemony or what Kuhn called a paradigm. 
Religion is not a necessary element if one wishes to question the legitimacy of economic 
claims and philosophies. However, viewing economy as religion is a bigger perspective, and 
the lack of scientific quality is only one important point within that perspective. It is crucial to 
keep in mind that the unscientific nature of economics is not the basis on which Nelson is 
calling it religion. He bases the definition on economics’ position as a deliverer of ultimate 
values in individuals and societies. The tendency to defy scientific norms is a result of the 
position this gives economics. Using Luckmann’s thinking, one could say that economics 
seems to fail at understanding the subjective contents of economy.  
3.4 History 
The control over government by economists has been given the name economocracy by none 
other than Alexander Hamilton, one of the founding fathers of the USA (Swan 
1979/1980:217). An economocracy is a technocracy of economists, and can be described as a 
government where economic theories are more powerful than democratic principles. If 
economists are put in charge of the economy of a country, and they attempt to shape that 
economy in the mold of their theories instead of using their theoretical knowledge to 
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understand the empirical reality of the economy and implement the politics of the 
democratically elected politicians, we can talk of an economocracy. 
Luckmann and Nelson both make a common point, which is that the shape of religion is 
always a product of historical conditions. It can only exist in its current form on the premises 
set by the past. Luckmann stresses that the form of religion which is usually seen as “normal”, 
meaning institutionalized church religion, “presupposed an intricate pattern of structural and 
intellectual conditions” (Luckmann 1967:62). For Luckmann, this was the reason why people 
were having difficulties recognizing new and different manifestations of religion in society. 
Nelson naturally struggles with this same issue. Seeing economics as religion is not easy, if 
one is historically conditioned to think of religion as being articulated and performed in a few 
very specific ways.  
What Nelson does, which is interesting in this context, is that he explores the historical 
preconditions of the economic manifestation of religion, and finds that they are very similar to 
those of “traditional” religions. Many of the same thinkers and traditions of thought are 
involved in the evolution of both Christian and economic ideologies, and Nelson shows how 
intertwined economics has always been with religion. In his analysis of the origins of 
economic religion, he posits that traditional religion has gradually been losing religious 
authority over society as it has become more secularized by the expansion of scientific 
explanations of the world. Definitional power was transferred from Christianity to natural 
science as the sciences progressed rapidly for example in the era of Isaac Newton. The social 
sciences grew as an extension of the natural sciences, and assumed religious authority of 
definition over the organization of society, based on a positivistic vision of governance. 
Nelson (2001:xxii) quotes the sociologist Robert Bellah: 
We can say that in contemporary society social science has usurped the traditional position of theology. 
It is now social science that tells us what kind of creatures we are and what we are about on this planet. 
It is social science that provides us images of personal behavior and legitimations of the structures that 
govern us. It is to social science that the task is entrusted, so far as it is entrusted at all, of, in whatever 
the contemporary terms for it would be, ‘justifying the ways of God to man’  
Economics are by far the most positivistic of the social sciences, aspiring to be a “harder” 
science than the others, and the more definitional power economics claimed, the more it came 
to resemble a religion. The more religious it became, the more doctrinal and utopian became 
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its teachings, thus losing its scientific basis. Utopias are visions of a reality which cannot be 
achieved in real life, and are therefore by definition big transcendences. Once people have a 
utopia as their goal, and let it define their ultimate values, they are participating in a religion. 
Despite the enormous achievement in political power this evolution has granted to economics, 
it has led the academic field to scientific disintegration (ibid:266-267).  
3.5 Parallels to Traditional Religion 
A characteristic analytical grip of Nelson’s is his use of traditional religious groupings to 
characterize economic ideologies. Using descriptions such as “Calvinistic” and “Puritan”, but 
most importantly the two large groupings “Roman” and “Protestant”, he ties the values and 
logics of different economic schools of thought to traditional religious ideologies. In a way it 
can seem like an elaborate expansion of Weber’s connection in The Protestant Ethic and the 
Spirit of Capitalism. Nelson locates Protestant and Roman cultural and religious traits of a 
wide variety in economic traditions and their central thinkers. 
The division of economic theory into two main traditions of thought, the Roman and the 
Protestant, is presented already in the introduction to Reaching for Heaven on Earth. Nelson 
claims that the Roman tradition reaches back all the way to the philosophy of Aristotle, goes 
via the famous theologian Thomas Aquinas and the scientific breakthroughs of Isaac Newton 
to the social philosophers John Locke, Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham and Claude Henri de 
Saint-Simon. From there, the Roman tradition moves on to the “Theorists of the Twentieth-
century Welfare State”, and further expresses itself in the economic theories of John Maynard 
Keynes (Nelson 1991:20). Similarly, the Protestant tradition starts with Plato, via Augustine 
and Martin Luther on to John Calvin and the English Puritans. From there it is influenced by 
Charles Darwin, which in turn inspires the thought of Herbert Spencer, Karl Marx and 
Sigmund Freud (ibid:21). The extremely wide stretch of time and area of social knowledge 
that Nelson here invokes by namedropping so many of the most important historical actors of 
the last 2500 years, justifies the length of his three-book analysis. It is also a natural reason 
why I cannot possibly analyze and evaluate all of his arguments within the scope of this text. I 
will have to stick to the broad strokes, and identify what is relevant to the theoretical 
discussion from my perspective as a sociologist. However, a basic explanation of the division 
between Protestant and Roman traditions in Nelson’s thinking is required, as he describes the 
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connecting of modern economic thought to the history of Western Theology as a “main goal” 
of his books (ibid:23). 
Nelson (2001:99) sees the progressive school of Samuelson as following “the Roman Catholic 
model”, because of the elevated status of the “priesthood” of Keynesian ideas. The Chicago 
school, on the other hand, can be seen “as a modern secular continuation in the tradition of 
Protestant Reformers such as Martin Luther and John Calvin” (ibid:18). The individualism of 
the Chicago economists, and their disdain for state-governed economic progress, leads Nelson 
(ibid:273) to see them as fighting a similar fight as the sixteenth century Protestants who 
“sought to abolish the distinctions between the leadership and the members of the church”. 
Nelson is mainly concerned with describing the economic landscape of the US, and he labels  
American economics as following the Roman Tradition (ibid:xxi). According to him, “we live 
in the late twentieth century in a new Roman era” (Nelson 1991:306). From the Norwegian 
perspective, America would naturally seem a lot more Protestant in Nelson’s terminology, 
meaning that they are more libertarian than the more regulated economics of the Scandinavian 
welfare state. However, these are observations completely dependent on the eye of the 
beholder, and they are presumably easily colored by the political opinion of whoever is 
observing. The political left will always have a different vision of salvation than the economic 
right. Some might argue that “the pursuit of self-interest and the ownership of private property 
are the wages of sin” (Nelson 2001:272), and thus be in favor of government control of the 
economy. Others may see the ideals of laissez-faire as an ideal way of organizing society. The 
former would by Nelson be defined as belonging to a Roman tradition of thought because of 
their belief in a common authoritative guidance of social morality and the ability of experts to 
act on behalf of everyone to the best of society. The latter, who idealize laissez-faire, would 
be categorized as Protestants by Nelson, because of their lack of the beliefs just mentioned, 
and their insistence that individuals themselves have the best idea what is good for them. A 
welfare state can in some ways be described as a state religion (ibid:264), providing a state-
sanctioned definition of what the road to economic heaven is. 
3.6 Placing People and Traditions 
The historical narrative that Nelson presents is, as I have mentioned earlier, far too extensive 
to be dealt with in its entirety within this limited text, but I will attempt to give a brief outline 
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of what I see as the most important points. Economics as Religion’s subheading is From 
Samuelson to Chicago and Beyond, and a lot of Nelson’s focus is on two modern traditions of 
economics. Paul Samuelson represents Progressivism, the Chicago School represents the 
Libertarian tradition, and with Beyond, Nelson is referring to New Institutionalism. While 
Reaching for Heaven on Earth deals primarily with the older historical roots of modern 
economic thought, Economics as Religion focuses on the recent history of economics, 
meaning that of roughly the last seven to eight decades. 
3.6.1 Progressive Gospel of Efficiency 
There is a powerful value system, a secular religion in essence lying at the heart of Economics (…). 
Economics was meant to instil, and to a considerable extent succeeded in instilling, a religious 
commitment to the market – now depicted as the ”market mechanism” – and a commitment to the 
priestly authority of economists to manage this marvelously productive instrument for the general social 
benefit” (ibid:50-51). 
Samuelson is in many ways Nelson’s starting point in Economics as Religion, and he uses 
him as a tool for building his argument about economics as religion. He refers to Samuelson’s 
main work, the textbook Economics as a Bible for economists, and says that it stands for an 
“economic Progressivism that has sought to use government to promote economic progress 
with the material benefits extended as far as possible and as equally as possible to all 
members of American society – and eventually to the salvation of all the world” (ibid:54). 
According to Nelson (ibid:17),  
many of the conclusions of Economics do not follow logically, if implicit theological assumptions are 
not made to sustain the argument (…). If we penetrate below the surface in this way, Economics is 
revealed to be a religious work grounded in articles of progressive faith.  
The relationship between priesthood and congregation is quite hierarchical in Nelson’s 
depiction of this tradition. 
Samuelson, according to Nelson (2010a:36) “claimed the exclusive authority of “scientific 
truth” for the ethical commandments of his economic god”. Nelson argues that the religious 
nature of Samuelson’s economic beliefs led him to seek to “use government to promote 
economic progress” (Nelson 2001:54). Samuelson comes from a Keynesian tradition of 
thought, which means that he argues for a strong redistributive government which oversees 
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the economy. He sees the economy in many ways as a morally corrupting element, which 
must be governed to avoid it having negative impacts on society (ibid:112). At the same time, 
Keynesian economics are presented as a hard science, influenced by the great minds of the 
natural sciences like Einstein (ibid:32). Samuelson believes that using this science to control 
the economy is the right way to achieve the highest possible efficiency, and this is what 
Nelson labels the gospel of efficiency.  
The goal of Economics, in short, is progress; the means is an efficient economic system; the sinners are 
the special interests; the greatest danger posed for the world is cyclical instability and unemployment of 
resources that will lead to demagoguery, dictatorship, and war. If the economy can instead be put on a 
track of rapid economic growth, poverty in the United States can soon be eliminated and with it the 
social ills of crime, drug abuse, suicide, and many others. As more and more people reach a high 
standard of living themselves, they will increasingly be willing to support government plans to 
redistribute resources to the less fortunate and otherwise take the collective actions needed for the 
further progress of American society. Growth can also provide the resources to build an 
environmentally beautiful world. Economic growth thus creates a “virtuous circle”. Within a few 
generations, all the old wars and other ills of human existence can be abolished forever after (ibid:110). 
The gospel of efficiency and the Progressive economic policies that it implies is based on 
thoughts that the economy is something which must be quite strictly controlled if it is to lead 
to all the wonderful things outlined above. Without governing, it can be a very destructive 
force. Nelson traces this type of thinking back through history, and says that Keynes, to whom 
Samuelson was a “disciple” (ibid:48), “agreed with Marx (and Jesus) that capitalism – 
necessarily grounded in the desire for money and the competitive workings of self-interest in 
the market – is a “disgusting” system, characterized by motives unworthy of human beings” 
(ibid:30). The gospel of efficiency thus preaches that the market is something that one should 
be reluctant to engage in, and that it is best left to be controlled by “professionals” in the form 
of a governing body of state-employed economists. 
Nelson argues that the faith in Samuelson’s teaching is based on the assumption that 
“participants in the marketplace will behave in a self-interested way, while participants in 
government will behave in a public-spirited way” (ibid:99). This solution to the market 
paradox can be said to have worked quite well for its period, but Nelson cannot accept its self-
contradictory actor model as anything but a large leap of faith. Eventually, it came to be 
challenged more and more, especially by the libertarian economists of the Chicago school. 
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3.6.2 Neoliberal Chicago School 
The Chicago School is in many ways a reaction to Keynesianism. Or, one could say that it is a 
return to the economic tradition that came before Keynesianism, the liberalism that 
Keynesianism was a reaction to, and which the progressives claimed to have eventually 
caused the Great Depression of the 30s. It all depends on how far back one wants to go. In the 
middle of the twentieth century there was wide acceptance of the gospel of efficiency, the 
Progressive economic politics of Keynes’ and Samuelson’s teaching. When the Chicago 
school turned many of their ideas on their heads, they earned the name “neo-liberals”. They 
wanted to set the market free.  
Milton Friedman is in many ways the poster-boy for Chicago school neoliberalism. Nelson 
sees him as reacting to the amount of responsibility that the Progressives gave to the 
government. He felt that “the government was typically making matters worse”, and 
“proposed that the government should step aside from its current involvement in a number of 
important areas” (ibid:148). The notion that the market or too much consumption can be bad 
at all is not featured in Friedman’s philosophy. According to Nelson, Friedman is a good 
example of a strongly proselytizing economist, full of religious zeal: “Friedman’s lifetime 
mission has been to persuade the American public of the correct ideas, and thus the correct 
form of government, a task to which he devoted great energy” (ibid:151). 
In fact, the neoliberalism of the Chicago school is not just one religion or one strain of the 
economic religion. It is quite a diverse school and can be said to contain several different 
religions which have some important common denominators (ibid:117). Though Friedman is 
often portrayed as being the most neoliberal anti-government economist imaginable, Nelson 
stresses that he was not purely libertarian, but that he combined progressive and libertarian 
values (ibid:141), since he did see quite a number of important tasks for the government, 
though they were different from and far more limited than what Samuelson or Keynes argued 
for. A common agreement among the economists of the Chicago school was that the political 
system was a “more cumbersome” system than the market, and that it consequently should be 
limited for the effective market to be able to flourish (ibid:152). The internal disagreements 
were to a large degree about how limited the government could be before it was too small. 
Another important economist from Chicago which Nelson devotes some time to explore is 
Gary Becker, which belongs to a “third generation” of the school. Becker was among the first 
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economists to openly challenge moral values in traditional religion and in society, arguing 
that “the mechanisms of individual exchange and other economic forces grounded in self-
interest, not the teachings of the church, drive the world” (ibid:167). He gained a lot of 
attention through the book The Economic Approach to Human Behavior, in which he saw 
crime, marriage, and other moral issues from a rational, self-interested point of view. In a 
way, he is trying to solve the market paradox by claiming that it isn’t a paradox at all. He is 
arguing that there is no dichotomy between self-interested actions in a market and selfless 
actions outside of it, because “the market is assumed to extend systematically to every area of 
life without exception” (ibid:175). While his analysis can be said to be flawed in many ways, 
he provides an interesting extreme example of the far end of the ideological scale when it 
comes to different solutions to the market paradox. 
To sum up these two main traditions of modern economics, one could say that Nelson 
effectively outlines the religious characteristics of the ideologies by pointing to their visions 
of transcendent utopias. In the Progressive religion, this utopia takes the form of a controlled 
economy, where growth is stable and to the benefit of a broad portion of society. In the 
Chicago School, utopia is a society where individuals are economically free to do what they 
like, and where the lack of burdening controls lets the economy grow until the future is 
nothing short of a secular salvation. 
3.6.3 Beyond: The New Institutionalism 
After placing the progressive movement in the Roman Catholic category which he 
constructed in the previous book, and the Chicago school in the Protestant tradition, Nelson 
focuses on the economic ideology known as new institutionalism. He says that “very little has 
been left standing of neoclassical economics - including the core ideas presented by 
Samuelson in 1948 in Economics”, and implies that in its place, new institutionalism is 
flourishing (ibid:219). However, he asserts that while the new institutionalist economists such 
as Joseph Stiglitz have been successful in breaking down the existing theories of neoclassical 
economics, “it is less clear (…) that they have provided a successful new alternative” 
(ibid:221). He does not place new institutional economics in a category of religious tradition 
or link it to any religious ideology. Beyond focusing on transaction costs and flaws in the 
information flow of the market, new institutionalism seems to have little to offer, in Nelson’s 
view. It appears to be more of a criticism of earlier methods and ideologies than a new 
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economic religion in its own right. Overall, Nelson seems to have a better grip on history than 
the present day. He is more concerned with the lineage of important ideas than he is with 
diagnosing modernity. 
3.6.4 Marxism as Religion 
Nelson focuses on various forms of capitalism in his analysis of economics as religion, but he 
also acknowledges that communist or other Marxist forms of organizing the economy can just 
as well be seen as religion. In fact, this is one of the most prevalent comparisons found 
between economy and religion. Nelson (ibid:112) posits that “When Marx saw the proletariat 
leading the way to heaven on earth, he was yet another messiah proclaiming a message of 
salvation for yet another chosen people”. Luckmann (1967:101-102) also talks about 
communism as a failed attempt to socialize everyone into an “official” model of ultimate 
significance. One could say that Marxism deals with the market paradox by abolishing free 
markets altogether. 
Despite the limitation of government which characterizes the ideology of the Chicago School, 
Nelson surprisingly finds a link between it and Marxism. He argues that  
The participants in the Chicago project share with Marxism the underlying conviction that everything 
that happens in life and society is ultimately driven by individual or class advantage. If an event would 
seem to have a character outside economic explanation, it simply reflects a failure of analytical 
understanding up to that point (Nelson 2001:185).  
It seems that one reason why it is more normal to hear communism being compared to 
religion than capitalism is that most people have an outside perspective on communism, and 
are opposed to its tenets. “It is perhaps easier to define a theology when it is under challenge 
(…). Perhaps modern economic theology is more readily identifiable, and its tenets easier to 
bring into focus today, because the benefits of modern economic progress have now become 
more widely questioned” (Nelson 1991:xxiii). In a lecture about his latest book, Nelson says 
that when talking to environmentalists and economists, they both think it is a “no-brainer” to 
accept that the other field is a religion, while they hesitate a lot more with accepting this 
definition of their own field (Nelson 2010b). 
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3.6.5 Conflict 
In the previous paragraphs, I have outlined Nelson’s narrative of conflicting traditions of 
economics. He has focused on the different underlying ideological philosophies of 
Protestantism and Roman Catholicism in his first book Reaching for Heaven on Earth. In that 
book he describes both the theological conflict between those two main traditions of western 
economic ideology, as well as their conflict with traditional religion: “Institutional religion in 
many cases fought bitterly to resist the intrusion of modern ideas” (Nelson 1991:13). 
Then he looks at the more recent and less abstracted conflict between Progressives and 
Liberalists in Economics as Religion. There, he claims that  
If the wars of religion four hundred years earlier had been fought among Catholics and diverse 
Protestant denominations within Christianity, the great wars of religion of the twentieth century were 
now fought among socialist, Marxist, fascist, American progressive, capitalist, and other branches of an 
overarching religion of progress (Nelson 2001:37-38).  
Still, though, traditional religion was also a competitor with the new economic ideologies, and 
they were often experienced as “obstacles” that had to be “displaced” by modern economics 
(ibid:88). Nelson quotes Joseph Stiglitz as claiming that the old economic ideologies had 
“replaced the religious doctrines that had so long held sway over humankind but were [now] 
held with the same emotional fervor; indeed the fervor was reinforced by the false sense that 
the [new economic] ideologies rested on scientific premises” (ibid:228). 
Luckmann (2004:145) also addresses the competition between traditional religion and other 
sacred universes, pointing out that the Christian representations no longer have a monopoly in 
the “market”, and that they also have to compete with symbolic universes built on other types 
of transcendence. “The relations of the church to political and economic institutions range 
from mutual support to partial accommodation to competition to open conflict” (Luckmann 
1967:80). 
The conflict between traditional religion and economy is exemplified by Pope John Paul II, 
who Nelson quotes in Economics as Religion. According to Nelson, the pope argued that “the 
false preachings of the economists of the modern era bore a large responsibility for the 
breakdown of the family, the crime, the indifference to suffering, the assaults on the natural 
environment, and other grave failings of the world in the late twentieth century” (Nelson 
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2001:321). Interestingly, the current pope has recently also made similar remarks. Pope 
Francis (cited in Pullella 2013) declared in a homily in 2013 that “The World has become an 
idolator of this God called Money”. 
The idea of economic religion “taking over” after traditional religion is a fascinating prospect. 
Of course, it may seem absurd to some, as people can profess to both a traditional religious 
belief such as Protestant Christianity, as well as a secular ideology such as Keynesian 
Progressivism at the same time. On the individual level, it seems people are bound to 
experiment and combine different sets of ultimate meaning. However, it seems that with a 
macro-view of social religiosity, the secular ideologies, at least in places like Western Europe, 
have become much more important points of ideological and moral orientation than the 
traditional religious ones. Logically, the transference of world-view domination from 
traditional religion to economy is not inevitable. There could have been, historically, other 
sets of social morality which took the role now possessed by economy, and there may yet be 
new transferences. 
In his most recent full length book, Nelson continues to focus on an ideological conflict, but 
this time, he has broadened his scope even more than before, to include religions that are not 
purely economic. The book is titled The New Holy Wars – Economic Religion VS. 
Environmental Religion, and introduces the idea that in the modern world, the biggest 
ideological conflict is one that takes place between two secular religions (or rather groups of 
religions), namely the economic religion and the environmental religion. Environmental 
religion was mentioned already in Economics as Religion, where he described it as a secular 
religion, “often in opposition to the earlier progressive faith in science and material progress” 
(Nelson 2001:36).  
While he in the previous books differentiated between different economic religions, in The 
New Holy Wars, Nelson sees them as somewhat united against common enemies: 
If the struggle between communism and capitalism was a holy war fought fiercely in the decades 
following World War II, the new holy wars of the twenty-first century are no longer likely to be mainly 
among different branches of economic religion. Rather, the greatest religious struggles of the future 
may be waged between economic religion and other types of noneconomic religious competitors, such 
as evangelical and Pentecostal Christianity or Islamic fundamentalism. There may also be new holy 
wars among religions that are altogether secular. Indeed, the deepest religious conflict in the American 
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public arena at the present is being waged between economic religion and environmental religion 
(Nelson 2010a:100-101). 
3.7 Environmental Religion 
So what does this environmental religion consist of? Nelson dedicates a lot of his latest book 
to exploring the ideology behind what he sees as the environmental religion, and the most 
succinct definition might be this from the conclusion of the book: “The ‘Religion of 
environmentalism’ has emerged to protest economic religion (…) and has fought this counter-
battle by presenting its own world-view and religion story. This message says that once we 
had an ideal world, or Eden, which was destroyed by progress, economic growth, and 
industry” (Nelson 2010a:348). Just like with the different economic religions, Nelson is 
drawing parallels to Christian theology, and he places environmentalism in a Calvinistic 
tradition of thought (Nelson 2001:314). The idea that humans are inherently sinful is an 
important element of the religion, and minimizing or nullifying human impact on the natural 
world is an important religious ideal. The goal is to return to the “Eden” in which humans 
lived in harmony with nature. This is the “heaven on earth” in the environmental religion, 
while the industrialized progressive economic vision of heaven from the “gospel of 
efficiency”, with its maximized human consumption and wealth, is seen as a “hell on earth” 
from the environmental viewpoint (Nelson 2010a:84). Of course, just as with economic 
religions, we are in reality dealing with a plurality of religions of environmentalism, and 
Nelson is generalizing and constructing ideal types based on broad traditions of thought. 
A lot of the dissent in this religious conflict or holy war revolves around the idea of economic 
growth. On one side, growth is seen as inherently good, as a sacred path to the salvation of 
mankind. On the other side, economic growth is not sacred, but profane. It is the root to all 
evil and it is leading humanity and even worse, the rest of the natural world, down a path to 
destruction and disaster. The worshipping of growth is seen by many as a very serious 
problem (ibid:308). A common comparison among the “theologians” or leaders of the 
environmental religion, is between the perpetual growth which is presupposed in many 
economic theories, and the physical characteristics of cancer (ibid:81). Uncontrolled and 
unlimited growth is seen as unsustainable and crippling in the long run. Humanity is seen to 
be pushing the world over the hill, and dooming itself through their greediness and blind 
selfishness. “For environmental religion, the problem is that human beings have acquired 
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divine powers but not divine wisdom” (ibid:342). We simply do not have the self-control 
needed for the powerful position humanity has put itself in, in relationship with the natural 
world.  
Basically, in this view, we as humans have developed a common culture, a mentality of 
endless growth which has reached its peak in the creation of the economic religions that are 
now pushing the ideology of growth and progress ever forward. Despite the fact that we have 
reached a standard of living in many parts of the world where further growth does not 
contribute to an increase in human happiness, and in many cases causes overconsumption that 
is harmful to both ourselves and the environment which we are dependent upon, we continue 
in the same way.  
To some extent it may be a matter of inertia: we have all agreed about the need for growth for so long, 
even in the midst of our disagreements about capitalism versus socialism—which can be seen as 
disagreements about how best to achieve growth—that we cannot easily refocus our politics on some 
other fundamental good” (Nelson 2013:49)  
Environmentalists are saying that we have had enough growth, and that we need to reevaluate 
our goals, in a society which bases its whole existence on the presumed moral sacredness of 
growth and progress. Luckmann (1967:88) addresses this type of paradox by claiming that 
there is a problem if the rate of social change “increases without a corresponding increase in 
the flexibility of the “official” model”. If applied to the situation of environmental religion’s 
conflict with economic religion, one could argue that there is a delay in the mainstream 
ideological views of society. Those who are part of the environmental movement have seen 
that the economic ideologies of progress have brought about enough growth, or even too 
much, and are now trying to develop a new set of moral attitudes that condemn growth. 
However, those who follow the economic religions are set in their ways, as is often a 
trademark of religious groups.  
While “everybody” is still socialized into the “official” model, the consequences of the changing 
“objective” circumstances in the everyday lives of the members of the members of the society will 
suffice to produce a marked degree of incongruence between the “official” model and the effectively 
prevalent individual systems of priorities. Such incongruence as may develop need not immediately 
change the individual systems of “ultimate” significance – that is, the internalized “official” model. It 
is more likely that those who have been successfully socialized into the “official” model will not 
consciously apprehend the changes in their effective priorities. (ibid.) 
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Environmentalism may be seen as such a challenge to the “official” model of economic 
growth. It remains to see if it can actually manage to change the world and the way people 
think about growth. 
Just like economics, environmentalism often claims to be based on science. Of course, the 
objective claims that environmental organizations and movements make are in fact based on 
strong scientific evidence which is agreed upon across many fields of research. However, it is 
important to be aware of the fact that the normative policy suggestions that spring from 
environmentalism do not necessarily follow from these. One may agree with the notion that 
humanity should strive to lower our carbon emissions, but this is not a fact that is caused 
directly by the scientific fact that our emissions are higher than before. The wish to protect the 
planet and the environment is a moral and normative stance based on the valuation of certain 
principles above others. Other world-views give other perspectives on what to do with the 
facts presented. In other words, it is important to remember that scientific facts can support, 
but not be the foundation of, moral assessments. 
The environmental movement, as Nelson sees it, is in a strong contrary position to economics. 
As he puts it, “The mainstream view of the large majority of economists holds out a path to 
heaven on earth through rapid economic growth and development” (Nelson 2010a:84). We 
can recognize this as a common theme across all of the economic religions we have discussed 
up until this point. Their internal disagreements were mainly centered on which path is the 
most effective. The final destination of a highly developed world and a wealthy society with a 
high standard of living and a high level of consumption is seldom a topic of discussion. 
Nelson also sees commonalities between the secular religions of economics and the secular 
religions of environmentalism. For example “Almost all religions have absorbed from 
Judaism and Christianity the understanding that history is a continuing path from an original 
beginning to a final ending, and that the greater meaning of an individual’s life is to be found 
in his or her place in this history” (ibid:333). More specifically, and maybe more surprisingly 
he finds common elements between the environmental and the libertarian ideologies: “Both 
outlooks are fearful of the uses which human beings will put the enormous new powers made 
available by the modern products of science and economics. Environmentalists are most 
concerned about the impacts on the natural world and libertarians about the impacts on human 
freedom” (ibid:280). A lot of the environmentalism that Nelson describes, is deeply 
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misanthropic at its core (Nelson 2001:316). It sees human intervention in nature as an 
inherently bad and evil thing, to the point where it values the survival of the human race lower 
than the survival of ecosystems. This is in many ways the pure antithesis and reverse of the 
anthropocentric values that are the basis of many economic theories. 
It may seem to some that Nelson is simply stating a case of complete cultural relativism, 
saying that nothing can be right or wrong, because different religious views are simply 
subjective ways of interpreting reality. Nelson himself denies this notion in an article where 
he argues that “Economics and environmentalism are not always religious. (…) It is not a 
religious statement to say that having more goods and services is better than having fewer. 
Likewise, other things being equal, having less risk of cancer is better than having greater 
risk” (Nelson 2012:6). The key, once again, for Nelson’s definition of these ideologies as 
religious, lies in the “ultimate” character of them. This becomes clearer once economic or 
environmental ideologies “intersect with pubic policymaking” (ibid.). Only when the 
ideologies are formulated into a complex vision of utopian goals and moral guidelines, do 
they form secular religions. 
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4 Analysis 
The previous paragraphs have outlined very briefly the narrative Nelson presents in his three 
books. Economics can be seen as different religious movements that seek to resolve the 
market paradox in different ways, and which have clear commonalities and ideological ties to 
traditional religious traditions. This is the essence of what he wants to convey, and it sums up 
his understanding of the history of modern economics. But it leaves us with an extensive host 
of theoretical questions. The sociologically interesting points of Nelson’s thinking do not lie 
mainly in this narrative, but rather in the many small theoretical considerations that build it 
up. This is where I want to focus my attention, and where I believe Luckmann, as I have 
presented him, will be a useful asset. 
4.1 Common Features between Nelson and Luckmann 
To begin, we can ask some of the questions which Luckmann poses in The Invisible Religion 
(Luckmann 1967:91): 
What is the hierarchy of significance in the world views of contemporary industrial societies? Is that 
hierarchy articulated in a sacred cosmos and, if so, how distinct and consistent is this articulation? 
What are the nature and the origin of the religious representations that constitute the sacred cosmos? 
What is their basis in the social structure? Are they located in an institutional arena that “specializes” 
in religion? Or are the religious representations distributed over several institutional areas? In other 
words, can we consider modern religion to be “regressing” to a social form of religion that preceeded 
institutional specialization? Or does the sacred cosmos in modern society have an institutional basis at 
all? If not, how is the sacred cosmos objectivated in society? – that is, in what way is it part of an 
objective reality? What role do the traditional institutions that “specialized” in religion play in this 
context? 
In Nelson’s thinking, concerning the hierarchy of significance in society, it is absolutely 
“articulated in a sacred cosmos”, and it is expressed through a definition of sin and salvation 
in economic terms. In Reaching for Heaven on Earth, Nelson (1991:xxi) argues that “Material 
scarcity and the resulting competition for limited resources have been widely seen as the 
fundamental cause of human misbehavior – the real cause of human sinfulness”. Therefore, 
growth and economic progress is seen as “the path to heaven on earth, to a secular salvation” 
(Nelson 2001:9). In effect, defeating “evil”, in the shape of material scarcity, will bring about 
the utopian perfect society. This is the sacred/profane divide of all economic religions in 
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Nelson’s view, and consequently the basis for the hierarchy of significance which they are 
built upon. If progress and increasing wealth and resources is seen as the ultimate goal, 
scarcity, poverty and lack of progress represents the profane end of the scale. Since 
completely eradicating hunger, scarcity and need in the world can be said to be a utopian 
vision, it makes sense to categorize it with Luckmann as a “big” transcendence. It is a vision 
of another reality altogether, which is attainable only by following specific steps, namely the 
policy suggestions of the economic religion in question. 
Using Luckmann’s conceptual apparatus, we can describe economic religion as a symbolic 
universe which provides a transcendent vision. This vision entails a normative set of values 
which has a hierarchical status above other, non-religious understandings of the life-world. 
The “unalterable order of things”, in Weber’s words, can be seen as identical to a religion, 
precisely because it is such an “immense cosmos” into which we are born. It does not simply 
shape us by being an objective framework into which we plan our lives. It also gives us the 
supreme guidelines, the ultimate values for what is desirable to achieve in such a life, both as 
individuals and as societies. The processes which have made economy into a secular religion, 
are the ones that were described in the chapter on Berger and Luckmann’s fundamental 
explanations of the construction of social reality. The economic institutions have been 
externalized as more than practical solutions to the problems of scarcity, because people have 
objectified them as necessary laws of reality. In their legitimization of these laws, they have 
become reified into dogmatic mythologies that can be categorized as religion. This religion is 
internalized and thus held up and passed on in the continuous dialectical social construction 
of reality. 
4.2 Secular Religion? 
Luckmann hints at the possibility of a secular religion several times in The Invisible Religion:  
Once the sociology of religion uncritically takes it for granted that church and religion are identical it 
blinds itself to its most relevant problem. It has prejudged the answer to the question whether, in 
contemporary society, any socially objectivated meaning structures but the traditional institutionalized 
religious doctrines function to integrate the routines of everyday life and to legitimate its crises. It 
therefore fails to concern itself with the most important, essentially religious, aspects of the location of 
the individual in society (Luckmann 1967:27).  
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Nelson positions economic religion in the place where Luckmann argues that there is a 
privatized and “invisible” version of religion. But even though he differs from Luckmann in 
the content of his argument, he still operates within the bounds of what Luckmann defines as 
religious. Nelson argues that in the past, “theology gave the meaning of human existence and 
the context in which events should be interpreted. (…) Perhaps the modern age has been naïve 
in believing that it is different” (Nelson 1991:xx). One could say that the sub-cosmos of 
economics has grown to the point where it mistakes itself for the real cosmos, so that instead 
of defining its own rules and realities within the limits of economic institutions, it starts 
defining the wider reality of the whole of society. 
Economy is not the only secular religion which Luckmann or Nelson’s thinking opens up for. 
One could imagine secular religions based on feminist thought, social theories based on 
Hegel, Plato or Nietzsche, or on environmentalism, like we have already discussed. Critics 
may ask why economy is singled out among all of these ways of thought that can be 
compared to religion. The most important answer to me, and I believe that Nelson would 
agree, is the power and scope of the economic religion. No other secular philosophies come 
close to the social influence of economic ideologies in the modern world. Critics may also 
point out that the wide definition of religion could be seen as interchangeable with culture. 
This is true, but it has also been true of the classic sociologists’ definitions of religion. The 
dividing line between these two concepts has never been and will never be easy, or even 
possible, to define. 
Luckmann writes that “symbolic universes are objectivated meaning-systems that relate the 
experiences of everyday life to a “transcendent” layer of reality. Other systems of meaning do 
not point beyond the world of everyday life; that is, they do not contain a “transcendent” 
reference” (Luckmann 1967:44). Luckmann himself may not see economy as containing a 
“transcendent” reference, but Nelson most certainly does. “The perfection of human 
existence, the arrival of the kingdom of heaven on earth (…) is attainable only along an 
economic route” (Nelson 2001:44). The goal of economic theory, or of economic theology, is 
a utopian society that must be defined as “beyond the world of everyday life”. Though the 
road to salvation is paved with mundane numbers, graphs and theories, the visions underlying 
these are of arriving at a sacred result. It can thus rightly be called a secular eschatology. 
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Luckmann (1967:94) also explicitly opens for the possibility of “‘secular’ ideas (…) 
competing successfully with the churches in determining the individual systems of ‘ultimate’ 
significance”. As we have seen, “ultimate significance” is precisely what Nelson focuses on 
when defining religion. Most people will usually not be cognizant of the sacred characteristics 
of the economic religion. “Matters of 'ultimate' significance, as defined in the official model, 
are potentially convertible into routinized and discontinuous observances (…) of specific 
religious requirements whose sacred quality may become merely nominal” (ibid:76). This 
means that parts of the religious life-world can become so normalized and reified that people 
no longer think of them as religious. Rituals with religious roots can become so ingrained in 
social life and culture that it is simply accepted as “just the way things are”.  We can see that 
in the economic religion, if we accept it as that, the “routinization” of religious ritual and 
teachings has become so complete that most people see absolutely no religious quality in their 
execution. Luckmann is clear that the nearness between the profane world and the sacred 
cosmos can vary between different expressions of religion (ibid:59). It seems that with the 
economic religion as presented by Nelson, they are so intertwined that the religious traits are 
hard to see unless you look closely enough. 
Nelson seems to disagree with Luckmann’s argument that there is no common 
institutionalized religion in modern society. He is saying that to the contrary, economic 
religion provides this communal vision of a transcendent layer of reality, a sacred utopia of 
heaven on earth. Though this is a point where Nelson and Luckmann may seem to be in a 
logical conflict, it is not unlikely that Luckmann would be open to Nelson’s ideas as a 
supplement to his own theorizing. Luckmann himself actually warns of the risk that non-
traditional religions may not be taken seriously as religions. The traditional versions of 
religion “are, indeed, the only part of the sacred cosmos that is commonly recognized as 
religious. The other elements are usually described as “pseudoreligious” or are not perceived 
as part of the sacred cosmos, despite the fact that they may be dominant themes in the 
prevalent individual systems of “ultimate” significance” (ibid:99). In our case, economy is 
only implicitly religious. It does not explicitly define itself as religion, it merely has the 
characteristics of religion in the way it is thought of and performed. 
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4.3 Inherently Religious? 
Though Nelson is claiming that there are not one, but a wide host of economic religions at 
work today, and though these include all of the most influential schools of economic theory in 
modern history, he does not claim that economics is inherently religious. Before beginning his 
argument, he writes that “it may be suggested that economics is not inherently a theological 
subject, but one that has often been misused and distorted for unscientific purposes. Properly 
purged of these influences, economics can and should become the valid science to which it 
has long aspired. In my opinion there may be some merit in this view” (Nelson 1991:xxiv). 
He does not argue with the theoretical basis for this argument, which is the possibility that 
there may at one time exist economics in the form of a neutral science. However, he does not 
see this as being the case in reality today, or in the foreseeable future. If such a future were to 
come, he predicts that “the students of material progress will no longer be the holders of the 
keys to a secular salvation, the members of society capable of giving the most authoritative 
priestly blessings. Rather, economists may well be more like accountants, lawyers or, doctors, 
administering a necessary practical service” (Nelson 2001:334). For those familiar with the 
history of economics, these words sound very similar to the hopeful predictions of John 
Maynard Keynes (1972): “If economists could manage to get themselves thought of as 
humble, competent people on a level with dentists, that would be splendid”. 
4.4 Economists 
The role of economists is a crucial point to understand in Nelson’s writing. He focuses on 
economists to a large degree throughout all of his books, and spends a lot of time analyzing 
and describing what he sees as the theological thoughts and actions of different economists. 
He describes them with the following:  
Economists think that their role in society is to provide technical knowledge to operate the economic 
system (…). However, another basic role of economists is to serve as the priesthood of a modern 
secular religion of economic progress that serves many of the same functions in contemporary society 
as earlier Christian and other religions did in their time (Nelson 2001:xv).  
The economic religion is a phenomenon that goes far beyond the academic field of economics 
and the profession of economist, but the theological authority lies with the priestly class of 
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economists. Their role in society is according to Nelson one of upholding “the normative 
foundation required for a rapidly growing modern economy” (ibid:8). 
Luckmann provides us with a good theoretical understanding of the role of priesthood when 
he writes about the requirements for an institutionalized religion to take shape in modern 
society. He writes of the “Differentiation of social roles whose specific and more or less 
exclusive task is the administration of knowledge and regulation of performances pertaining 
to the sacred universe” (Luckmann 1967:63). While the economy has a religious character 
that spans from ideology to practice not just in the academic or professional fields, but across 
all of society, Nelson focuses on the religious authorities more than the casual believers. He 
chooses to look at the priesthood of economists rather than the congregation of regular 
consumers. 
Economists have a special role in the conveying of the belief in the economic religion. 
Through their assumed authority over economic problems in society, and through the 
inaccessible language and logic of their academic field, they are guardians of the true 
economic gospel. Joan Robinson (1971:47) argues that the student of economic theory is not 
encouraged to ask questions about the foundations and repercussions of the performance of 
their trade: “Before he ever does ask, he has become a professor, and so sloppy habits of 
thought are handed on from one generation to the next”. Objectification of the economic 
theories and models make them seem like natural and unchangeable rules, instead of the man-
made chosen paths they are. 
Luckmann (1967:82) writes that “The stability of the sacred cosmos is (…) one of the most 
important vested interests of the influential body of religious experts”. In economic religion as 
in any other religion, the role of religious expert is dependent on sustaining belief in the 
population. This is done by maintaining the sacred cosmos as a constant impression of reality. 
Peter Berger, Luckmann’s former partner, provides a useful concept, “plausibility structures”, 
for understanding this activity, which is still very much theoretically aligned with the ideas of 
The Social Construction of Reality.  
Each conception of the world (…) can be analyzed in terms of its plausibility structure. (…) The 
dynamics most definitely pertains to any religious affirmations about the world because these 
affirmations are, by their very nature, incapable of being supported by our own sense experience and 
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therefore heavily dependent upon social support. (…) It will be useful if those who are of the greatest 
emotional significance to the individual belong to this supportive community (Berger 1970:36). 
In other words, for the economic religion to work, it has to be kept plausible in the eyes of the 
believers. This is not done only by economists, but also by regular people, and it is important 
that those who are “significant others” to an individual reaffirm these beliefs through 
externalizing. In Nelson’s books, the laymen are not given a central role, and I think this can 
be attributed to the fact that he is not a sociologist. He is more interested in the theology of 
economics and how it is discussed and administered by those with the most academic and 
religious authority, than the social dynamics of how the religion is organized among regular 
believers. I think Berger and Luckmann here can provide a wider understanding of how the 
religion works, which currently lacks in Nelson’s work. 
When people believe in something religiously, they defend the plausibility structures that 
keep their belief going. If religion did not have such a defense-mechanism, it would surely 
fade away as soon as it was faced with evidence and superior arguments. John Milton Yinger, 
here quoted by Patrick McNamara, explains the defensive stance people get about their 
religious convictions even in secular value systems with the following:  
Even if one excluded the possibility of a transcendent or supernatural, one nonetheless is very likely to 
treat one’s system of ultimate explanation with a great deal of jealous reverence and respect and to be 
highly incensed when someone else calls the system of explanation to question or behaves contrary to it 
(McNamara 1974:5). 
Gilbert Rist argues that economic religion has created a sort of immunity defense: “criticism 
cannot touch it. You say the market doesn’t keep its promise to allocate resources in an 
optimum way? That’s because the market is not yet perfect” (Rist 2011:159). This means that 
if a promised result fails to materialize, it was not the theory that was wrong, but the 
implementing economists or politicians who were not trying hard enough. When talking about 
economy as religion, one should be wary of potentially creating one’s own “immunity 
defense”, where no criticism is valid because anyone who does not think the same way about 
economics can be labeled as “religious” and therefore not able to see clearly their own 
religiosity. Using such arguments, there is real danger of the discussion disintegrating to the 
endless meaninglessness of a doctor who diagnoses all of her patient’s efforts to prove his 
own sanity as symptoms of insanity. 
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Economists do have an important role as stewards of the theology of the economy of religion. 
They are the priestly authorities which align people’s understanding of such things as the 
market and the proper attitudes towards greed and restraint in economic questions. “With the 
increasing specialization of religious roles laymen come to participate less and less directly in 
the sacred cosmos. Only the religious experts are in “full” possession of the sacred 
knowledge” (Luckmann 1967:66). This is something we can also find in Nelson’s thinking 
about the roles of economists. They are now very dominant in defining economic reality, to 
the point where they assume political authority over many others. Most of all, they have a 
legitimizing role in the economic religion: “The most vital religion of the modern age has 
been economic progress. If economists have had a modest impact in actually generating this 
progress, or even understanding the actual mechanisms by which it has occurred, they have 
had a large role in giving it social legitimacy” (Nelson 2001:329). As we know from 
Luckmann’s writing, legitimation is an important process when constructing a comprehensive 
and widespread religious worldview. 
So, is Nelson simply blaming all of society’s problems on this priestly class of economists? Is 
it they who have made their profession into a religious force which has come to rule the world 
in directions we may not want? To the contrary: Nelson (ibid:332) argues that “Economists 
did not create their current role in society. They have been following a script prescribed by the 
broader rituals of the religion of economic progress”. There is no single mastermind or a 
conscious plan behind the religious form the economy has taken. Through the processes of the 
social construction of reality, economic institutions, ideologies and roles have gradually taken 
on the religious characteristics described by Nelson.  
4.5 Religion as Label 
Religion can be a value-neutral analytical tool and still be perceived as offensive or critical. 
Calling someone religious does not disqualify their opinions. Even though some economists 
or other believers in the market may not want their arguments to be compared to religion 
(ibid:313), this does not mean that it is not a legitimate comparison. The same can be said of 
people who prefer the label “spiritual” over the label “religious”. Even though they may have 
a problem with the term itself, they still usually fit into the category of religious behavior, and 
can be understood through the terms normally used for religion. 
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One of the responses that might come from economists when challenged with the idea that 
their theories amount to a religious doctrine is “but it works!” Since the theories fulfill their 
task of filling people’s pockets, and since markets function in ways that are at least similar to 
the ways economists think they should, surely they cannot be “just” religion. To that, my 
response is that religion also “works”. Just because there is no proof that God has created the 
world, or that people go to heaven when they die, this has not stopped Christianity from 
shaping large parts of the world in accordance with its teachings. Similarly, just because there 
is no proof that there has ever existed “perfect information” in markets or that wealth “trickles 
down” to the poorer strata of society, these obstacles have not stopped economists from 
shaping markets all around the world according to models which are based on these 
presumptions. 
The views expressed by Robert Nelson about the nature of economics and other “secular 
religions” are not exactly mainstream views. Therefore, it is natural that his books are met 
with a certain degree of criticism. First of all, as just mentioned, the label of religion may be 
perceived by some as derogatory. Furseth and Repstad (2003:32) point out that labelling 
something as a quasi-religion or as a religion-surrogate is often perceived as a negatively 
loaded description. In other words, it comes as no surprise that many economists will not 
accept Nelson’s analysis. Especially the parts of his books where he claims that economists 
are not as “scientific” as they think themselves, will naturally ruffle the feathers of exactly the 
kind of economists which he is talking about: those who are very confident of the scientific 
authority of their own field and profession.  
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5 Discussion 
5.1 Reception of Nelson’s books 
I have found quite a lot of reviews of Nelson’s work, especially of the centerpiece Economics 
as Religion, which seems to be the book which has garnered the most attention. There was in 
fact a symposium of several reviews in the Case Western Law Review volume 56 from 
2005/06, spanning over more than a hundred pages, including a “Reply to the Commenters” 
from Nelson. Drawing from these reviews and others, I will now try to show what the most 
important criticisms of Nelson’s thinking are. My aim is to show what some possible 
problems with Nelson’s argument might be. I will first identify some of the criticisms raised 
by reviewers of the books, and then I want to discuss some of my own issues with the 
sociological utility of Nelson's thinking. 
Some of the reviewers in the symposium are convinced by Nelson’s reasoning, and are quite 
positive. A review by Boettke, Coyne and Leeson (2005:552n) establishes that “Nelson’s 
work should not be read as an indictment of economics in the least. All that he is attempting 
to show is that economics do not practice a form of value-free analysis, and, in fact, cannot 
practice value-freedom when they offer policy guidance”. While Nelson might not agree that 
this is all he is attempting to do, these reviewers are not taking offense at his comparison 
between economics and religion, an offense which can blur the view of the analytical insight 
Nelson provides. They also seem to embrace the idea that at least the description of 
Keynesian economics as religion is quite accurate (ibid:559). They “believe that the 
priesthood status of our fellow economists has done severe damage to our discipline and in 
the long run will delegitimize the teachings that economics offers” (ibid:567). In sum, they 
accept the religious description when applied to their ideological counterparts in Progressive 
economics, but are much more reluctant to accept it as a label to their own practice of 
economics. They see macro-economic governmental control as a religion, but do not see the 
religious qualities of Hayek or of neoliberal visions of growth and the powers of the free 
market. To them, it is the faith in the possibility of fully understanding and controlling the 
market which is the fault, and which can be described as religious. 
Another who writes favorably about Nelson is Andrew P. Morriss, in the introduction to the 
symposium: “Not content to simply score points off some easy targets, and economists often 
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present surprisingly easy targets, he delves into the subject, moving with admirable ease 
between theology and economics and treating both as serious endeavors” (Morriss 2005:549). 
Morriss also appreciates something which it seems not all of the reviewers understood: “the 
debate over whether economics is a science or a theology is not a debate over facts about the 
world but over the appropriate characterization of a manner of examining the world” 
(ibid:548). 
Out of the reviews I have read, most of the reviewers are critical of Nelson’s project, and 
some even completely reject his main ideas as useless. I will not go into detail about each 
review, but give only a brief summary of the main issues that are raised in the critical reviews. 
These can be split into two main groups; those who criticize Nelson’s handling of religious 
concepts, and those who disagree with his understanding of the economic field. 
One fundamental point of criticism is directed at Nelson’s definition of religion. Nelson bases 
his analysis on a broad, functional definition which focuses on the way religion identifies and 
promotes ultimate values which guide people and societies. Of course, this is not the only 
valid definition of religion, and if one completely disagrees with this definition, and argues 
that it fails to capture the true essence of what religion is (Nalls 2005:614-620), then Nelson’s 
project can subsequently seem like a pointless exercise. Under the same category of criticism 
of Nelson’s theological analysis, some also question the normative implications of the 
religious labeling (Hill 2005:587), or the coherence of Nelson’s comparisons to traditional 
religion (Colander 2003:339). According to these critics, Nelson’s comparisons can 
sometimes deteriorate into confusing analogies with unclear normative overtones. 
Disagreements over both the idea of comparing economy to religion at all, and over the 
details and implications of this comparison, are important points of criticism. While Nelson 
(2005:672) dismisses most of this criticism as narrow-minded and biased, it nevertheless 
represents a large portion of the feedback he seems to be getting from within economics.  
The other main group of criticism is concerned with Nelson’s depiction of the economic field. 
Some are confused about why economics are even the chosen field of comparison 
(McChesney 2005:609), and one could certainly be justified in asking this question, as there 
are many other social sciences and ideologies who may also seem to be deserving of the 
treatment which Nelson gives to economics. Nelson’s argument is that economics has 
achieved a dominating power in society and a wider scope of authority than any comparable 
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social science, but there will always be people who disagree with this version of reality. Other 
criticizers of Nelson’s economic understanding focus on his spotlighting of the market 
paradox (Hill 2005:590; Colander 2003). They argue that this is an outdated or overly 
simplified perspective on economics. While Nelson as an economist himself is certainly a 
qualified critic of his own field, it is obviously a field where his point of view is not accepted 
as true by all other economists. 
The main disagreement that people seem to have with Nelson, though, from the reviews that I 
have read, seem to be with his description of the economic field as unscientific. Economists 
(Ulen 2005:651; McChesney 2005) dispute and take offence at Nelson’s implications that 
their field has lost touch with empirical reality and is being guided by ideological value-
judgments. There is a strong general reluctance to accepting Nelson’s ideas which is based on 
the mainstream acceptance of economics as a scientifically sound and empirically based 
endeavor. Especially people who are directly involved in the business of economics and 
therefore have cause to take personal offence at Nelson’s belittling of the quality of the field, 
seem to be provoked by what they interpret as pejorative attacks directed at economics. 
5.2 Lack of Sociological Perspective 
To me, and to the stated goals of this thesis, the above points of criticism do not seem very 
useful. One can agree or disagree with how Nelson understands economics, religion or 
science. I am more interested in what the consequences are if one accepts at least his main 
ideas as interesting perspectives, if not objectively and universally true. With this in mind, an 
important point of criticism from my own perspective is Nelson’s lack of sociological 
perspective. What I mean by this is that he raises a lot of questions that are sociologically 
relevant, but he lacks the sociological frame of reference in theory and method that a 
sociologist would bring to the table. Naturally, a psychologist, an anthropologist or a political 
scientist might have argued in the exact same way, as we all see the world from a specific 
perspective influenced by our disciplines way of thought, and it is always easier to see the 
benefits of our own discipline than it is to see that of others. This is the way it is, and this 
being a sociological thesis, I cannot but argue for a sociological understanding of Nelson’s 
work. In many ways, this thesis has attempted to add that perspective to Nelson’s thinking. 
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Using Thomas Luckmann’s sociology of knowledge as a lens through which to read Nelson 
has been enormously helpful. A lot of the sociological understanding that may not be readily 
available in Nelson’s texts appear very easily when Luckmann’s theoretical apparatus is 
added. Sociology is very often about seeing the interplay between individual and society, and 
while Nelson mostly focuses on the broader trends in society, Luckmann can provide the 
logical link to the human beings who build up this society, and can explain how they interact 
to make Nelson’s perception of economics make sense. 
The link between Nelson and Weber is an important sociological comparison. Weber also 
focused on the grand scheme of things in his sociology. While he certainly intended to include 
the individual in his sociological verstehen, it can be argued that his actual work leaned more 
towards a macrosociology than a microsociology (Ritzer 2011:118, 125). The most obvious 
link between Nelson and Weber is their connections between specific religious traditions and 
economic philosophies. Nelson categorizes some economics as Roman Catholic and others as 
Protestant, while Weber ties the Protestant ethic to the Spirit of Capitalism. Of course, while it 
sounds quite similar, they do their comparisons in widely different ways. While Weber argues 
that the Protestant ethic was “one of the causal factors in the rise of the modern spirit of 
capitalism” (ibid:119), Nelson uses a different strategy of comparison. He ties economic 
ideologies back to both religious and non-religious philosophical and scientific roots, and 
places these into the categories of Roman and Protestant. The comparisons are very 
enlightening in a philosophical sense, and put an interesting spin on the history of modern 
economics, but what is the sociological relevance of this exercise in the history of ideas? To 
grasp this sociological relevance, I am saying that one needs to add something to the 
reasoning of Nelson, and that the social constructivist phenomenological sociology of Thomas 
Luckmann is a fitting addition in this sense. The sociology of knowledge and the 
phenomenological tradition from which Luckmann comes, insists that we go deeper and take 
into account the sources and the consequences of the ideologies. It asks how ideological 
changes alter individual understandings of reality, or life-worlds. 
Luckmann goes further than Nelson does in explaining the very nature of religion. While 
Nelson simply employs a broad functional definition of religion, Luckmann explains at length 
why such a definition is justified, necessary and useful. He goes to the anthropological roots 
of religion, and explains why religion is a part of what defines humans as human. He also 
explains how and why the mainstream conception of religion is as narrow as it is, and how 
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this results in a not very useful understanding of religion. If a term is to be properly useful, 
going to the core of its meaning, as Luckmann does, is a good point of departure. This is 
something which, in my opinion, lacks in all three of Nelson’s books. 
Furthermore, the understanding of social reality which Luckmann bases his thinking on, not 
just in The Invisible Religion, but also in The Social Construction of Reality, gives us a much 
clearer understanding of how ideas, religious or not, are communicated and passed on from 
one generation to the next. It also lets us understand how religion, economic or not, can gain 
and utilize its status as religion in the social reality of everyday life. These concerns are not 
discussed by Nelson. He is mostly interested in the evolution of the ideas of economics and 
how they change at the level of the trendsetting and authoritative leaders of the economic 
field. He describes them as a priesthood, but he does not explain how the ideas are transferred 
from priesthood to congregation, except for some vague assumptions about the power of 
religious authority. He focuses on the professional and academic field of economics, where a 
sociologist might instead be interested in the economy, meaning the whole institution of how 
people socially organize the exchange of goods and services. To Nelson, this has not been as 
important a differentiation, as he has more or less consciously chosen to focus on economics, 
and not economy. But basing ourselves on Nelson’s project, it is possible to expand our view, 
using sociological theory, to achieve an even more comprehensive understanding of the 
religious aspect and characteristics of the economy as a whole, as it exists in modern society. 
Another minor issue that I have with Nelson is his very America-centric focus. He 
concentrates almost entirely on the history of economics and the economic situation in the 
US, with a few minor exceptions. A restrictive scope can be useful and sensible when dealing 
with problems as complex as the ones Nelson is dealing with, but I think that a lot of his ideas 
are more universal than what his books express. What may be useful in focusing on the US is 
that it may be a country where the religious nature of economics has been easier to spot than 
in other parts of the world. The freedom and pride that characterizes the American economic 
reality may cause the religious traits to be more prominent there. 
In sum, Nelson’s books are not to be read as holy books of truth, but from a sociological point 
of view, they have some very interesting ideas to offer. From my perspective as a sociologist, 
one of Nelson’s biggest problems is his lack of sociological insight, and the lack of focus on 
the economic religion as a social phenomenon, and not just an ideological one at the level of 
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theology. Nelson writes as an economist, so I find it necessary to export those ideas and 
combine them with sociological theory to gain sociological insight from them. My criticisms 
of Nelson are widely different from the criticism he receives from many economists. A lot of 
that criticism seems to deny the validity of a lot of what Nelson is saying, but Nelson explains 
this as misunderstanding the analytical use of religion as a rhetorical critique. 
5.3 Fundamental Critique of the Utility of the Comparison 
Moving on from these relatively specific problems with Nelson’s books, I now want to briefly 
discuss some more general issues concerning the utility value of the ideas Nelson represents. 
When integrating the sociological perspective that has been presented in this thesis, Nelson’s 
argument is arguably a solid, analytically valid and philosophically interesting way of 
understanding the modern world. However, the usefulness of the comparison between 
economy and religion may still be quite limited, realistically speaking. In the following 
paragraphs, I will attempt to raise what I deem to be the most problematic issues around the 
concept of Nelson’s comparison and its usefulness. 
First of all, it seems utopian to convince people of the validity of Nelson’s analysis. Even 
though it may make a lot of sense to the initiated, the roles of the economic discipline and the 
economic institutions in society are so objectified to the degree of reification that it seems 
futile to try to change them. Even though one might agree with the analytical value of 
Nelson’s ideas, it might be wise to evaluate the potential it has to actually convince people. If 
one has an ambition to change economic debate there could be ways to go about it that might 
work better than the comparison of economy to religion.  People evidently are insulted by 
many of the implications that spring from Nelson’s line of reasoning. One could see this as a 
problem of revolution versus gradual change. If one feels that the religious nature of the 
economy is a problem, one can either try to make everyone see its religious nature and hope 
that this fundamentally changes how people understand it and how it is performed, or one can 
try to engage with the economists that are keeping our current economic system going and 
argue for gradual change. The comparison between economy and religion might be a useful 
strategy for the revolutionary and external critique, but I think that if one wants to change the 
economic system through internal arguments, it might not be as useful an idea. 
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If one decides to go the revolutionary direction, the implications of Nelson’s thinking are also 
very unclear. Even though the main body of Nelson’s analysis is solidly built and presents a 
unified and coherent logic, it seems to a certain degree to fall apart towards the ends of his 
books, when he imagines the potential impact of his work. This is especially true towards the 
end of Reaching for Heaven on Earth. Here, he spends more than 25 pages arguing that “full 
freedom of religion can be attained only by granting each individual a right to join with other 
coreligionists to form a sovereign state” (Nelson 1991:318). He presents the “right of free 
secession” as the ultimate solution to the problems raised by the identification of economics 
as a religion. Following this logic, he concludes his book with the argument that “The right of 
free secession might thus supersede economic principles of free markets, free trade, and other 
past freedoms in providing a founding principle for a postmodern economic order” (ibid:327-
328). In essence, Nelson is suggesting a radically different way of organizing the entire world 
as a response to the issues he raises about the religious nature of economics. His ideas may be 
interesting, but do not seem to be a direct logical consequence of the rest of his argument. 
This leads us to the second important problem of Nelson’s thinking. In addition to the utopian 
nature of the idea that it is possible to convince people that Nelson’s thinking is correct, 
logical and useful, the implications of accepting them as any of these things are highly 
unclear. As an example, I myself am fairly sympathetic to the analysis Nelson provides, but I 
have a big problem with accepting the conclusions that he arrives at based on this analysis, 
exemplified by the quotes in the previous paragraph. It would seem that there is no clear 
logical consequence that springs directly from the reasoning that economy is equal to religion. 
It is a fascinating thought, and it may give some analytical insight into the nature of economy, 
but beyond this, it seems extremely ambiguous in its further implications. 
For philosophers, anthropologists, theologians, psychologists and sociologists, the comparison 
between economy and religion might be an interesting twist on the way we understand social 
reality. But outside of these fields, a pessimist could easily point out that realistically 
speaking, it is very much a purely theoretical concept, an intellectual fancy which seems 
destined to remain removed from operationalizable and quantifiable empirical reality. For 
people outside of these disciplines, and in many cases for large portions of people inside of 
these disciplines, the concept is merely a thought experiment with no implications in real life. 
In my own work with the concept, I have encountered both ends of the spectrum within my 
own academic field, from people who find the idea to be thoroughly fascinating and 
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intellectually stimulating, to those who see no value at all in the ideas presented and hesitate 
to accept it as even remotely interesting.  
For outside observers of the economic field, the comparison between economy and religion 
seems to make a lot more sense than for the inside practitioners of economics. While Nelson 
is open about this fact and even tries to explain it, it is nevertheless a big problem. While 
outsiders may be sympathetic to discussing economy as a religion, this will not be helpful in 
any real way as long as economists completely refuse the idea. The problem may also be that 
even for those who do find the idea fascinating and even useful for the purpose of better 
understanding the nature of modern economy, its usefulness reaches a limit. If we accept that 
economy functions as religion and that it fulfils the requirements of our functional 
understanding of what a religion is, this may be enlightening to us as individuals, but it is 
difficult to see how it may change reality in any significant way. As long as it seems 
improbable to convince any large portion of society of the religious qualities of the economy, 
even changing the way we talk about it seems hard to achieve. 
Of course, even though one could easily be pessimistic about the prospects of the acceptance 
of the comparison between economy and religion, I still would argue for the use of this 
comparison. I think that in many contexts it has been used fairly successfully by current 
authors and participants in critical debate about the state of modern economy, and I think that 
it may still be used in a fruitful way. Even though redefining economy as a whole into being 
understood in the mainstream as a religion seems improbable, I am sure that using religious 
metaphors and analogies, in addition to full-on analytical comparisons, can help people alter 
their perceptions of how they perceive economy in society. Even without accepting the 
definition of economy as a religion in the true meaning of the word, as Nelson intends it to be 
understood, people can gain something from the idea. In the sociological tradition used in this 
thesis, represented by the phenomenological sociology of knowledge of Thomas Luckmann, 
even the slight alteration of people’s world views is a valuable and important part of changing 
society, and a valid goal for social scientists and others. In the following sections of this 
thesis, I want to take a look at different ways of using the comparison between economy and 
religion in changing people’s perception of social reality.  
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5.4 Usefulness 
The labeling of economic views as religion obvously has rhetorical potential. But this does 
not mean that labeling something as religious is necessarily a negative thing. The real problem 
is being oblivious to the religious nature of what we believe in, and what we let our society be 
governed by. The varieties of economic religions are many. Nelson explains the theological 
foundations of both Keynesianism and Marxism. Nazism can be seen as one secular religion, 
psychology as one and environmentalism as another. A functional definition of religion, 
relating to the “ultimate values” of individuals, open up for a world view in which we all 
believe in some sort of religious symbolic universe. I myself can be seen as a believer in or 
follower of some form of environmental and progressive economic religion on the left side of 
the political landscape.  
Traditional religion is respected, at least in public debate, as something people are allowed to 
believe in, but it is usually not accepted that they blatantly push it on other people, or impose 
their religious doctrines on all of society. Any time legislation is influenced by religion in any 
western democracy, it provokes outrage and public debate about the limits between 
democracy and faith. If we see various economic ideologies as secular religions, this might 
change the way economy is debated publicly.  
Nelson argues for the usefulness of his definition of economics and environmentalism as 
religion with the following:  
Greater recognition of the underlying religious character of economics and environmentalism can serve 
economists and policy analysts (and environmentalists) well in several respects. It might give them a 
better intellectual understanding of why economists and environmentalists often have so much trouble 
in talking to one another. It might help in crafting policy proposals with a greater chance of acceptance 
by the other side. It might also encourage a healthy greater modesty among economists and policy 
analysts in advancing their ideas in political debates. Moreover, it might help to reduce the hypocrisy 
involved when powerful religious values are advanced in the name of objective economic or 
environmental “science” (Nelson 2012:15). 
In addition to serving economists and others in their debates about the road to salvation, I 
think it is important to add that this perspective is useful for sociological understanding. 
Based on the phenomenological perspectives which I have outlined in this text, the crux of 
sociology is understanding the dialectic between objective and subjective reality. The very 
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construction of social reality is based on this relationship, and religion is an important concept 
needed to fully understand how it works. 
One of the values in seeing economy as religion lies in understanding the dynamics of how 
economics convinces people, its followers, of what truth, progress and salvation is. 
Recognizing that we may not see economic truth as truth because of scientific proof, but 
because of faith, is a result of recognizing the religious nature of economy. So is 
comprehending that progress in economic thought is based on a set of values that are not 
objective, but subjective and even religious in nature. The salvation which different ideologies 
of economics promises is not a real politically achievable goal but a utopia, and understanding 
this provides us with a more fundamental understanding of modern economy than we would 
otherwise have. 
Awareness of the religious qualities and the religious nature of economy could potentially 
change the public debate around economic philosophy. An acceptance of how far from 
science the economic discipline is might cause it to be challenged in new ways. If critique was 
aimed at the theological assumptions and the premise of faith in economics, it might have a 
different impact. Instead of simply critiquing economic theories for the fact that they are 
wrong or do not mirror reality in a satisfactory way, a deeper, theological critique could 
critique why they are wrong, and why they fail to adjust to the regular critiques. To me, it 
seems that Nelson’s goal is not necessarily to use the comparison to call for a “more 
scientific” economics. Rather, it seems the main goal is always to simply gain a better and 
deeper understanding of the nature of economics. 
Nelson writes several times of the potential usefulness of his project. He suggests that one 
should admit to the religious nature of economics and other secular religions, and 
consequently redefine the public discussions about these issues as theological conversations. 
“Theology was in the past and can again in the future be an arena for useful discussion of 
leading economic, environmental, and other public issues” (Nelson 2001:313n). With the 
status that the terms religion or theology has in today’s public debate, this seems like a very 
unlikely vision, but it confirms once again that Nelson never means anything derogatory when 
he defines secular institutions as religious. He is simply pointing out their religious nature, not 
trying to take away from their legitimacy as social forces. The question of whether religious 
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ideas have legitimacy in society is separate from the question of whether or not we can define 
something as fundamentally religious. 
C. Wright Mills (2000:194) argues that the most important task of sociologists is “addressing 
ourselves to issues and to troubles, and formulating them as problems of social science”. I see 
the concept of economic religion as a tool to achieve this purpose. Seeing the religious 
qualities of economy can help us understand why it is such a powerful force in society despite 
its apparent failures in bringing about salvation and a new economic heaven on earth. In the 
following segment of this text, I want to identify some authors who actually seem to be trying 
to bring economic debate into the theological realm, as Nelson is calling for, or maybe rather 
bringing theological language into economic debate. I mentioned a few short examples in the 
introduction to the paper, but here, I want to use the theoretical background that has been 
established by Robert Nelson and Thomas Luckmann’s respective works to see how useful 
these might be. 
5.5 Usage of the Comparison 
As I mentioned in the introduction, labeling economy as religion in some way or form is not 
unusual, and in my work on this thesis, I have come across many examples. I am going to 
mention some of these examples here, and try to evaluate if the use of the economy/religion 
comparisons in other sources compares well to the vision Robert Nelson has of discussing 
economics as theology. The material which I have found has been from people on the left side 
of the political spectrum. Some are academics, some are journalists, and some are economists, 
but all of them are hostile towards the free-market philosophies of the political right, or what 
is usually called “neoliberalism” by its critics. 
Neoliberalism, according to David Harvey (2005:2), is  
A theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by 
liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework 
characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade. 
The “neo” in neoliberalism signifies that this is a revival and a resurgence of the ideas of 
classical liberalism, which was also an economic philosophy that demanded limited 
government and strong civil liberties. The ideas of a laissez-faire political approach to the 
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economy, and a self-regulatory market, form the basis for the tradition. In Nelson’s 
terminology, we are talking about the Protestant religious economics of the Chicago School. 
5.5.1 Anti-Neoliberals 
One of the most notorious critics of neoliberal economy is Canadian journalist and author 
Naomi Klein. She got a lot of attention for her 2007 book The Shock Doctrine, which in many 
ways is both an attack on free-market economics generally, but also on the Chicago economist 
Milton Friedman specifically, as he is the inventor or at least the figurehead for what Klein 
calls the Shock Doctrine. In Milton Friedman’s own words, “Only a crisis – actual or 
perceived – produces real change. When that crisis occurs, the actions that are taken depend 
on the ideas that are lying around” (Friedman 1982:ix). The strategy of the Shock Doctrine, 
according to Klein, is to have neoliberalism be an idea that is “lying around”, and when an 
opportunity, in the shape of a crisis, presents itself, neoliberalism is applied to a wide array of 
policies, shocking the system into line with the rest of the global economy. According to 
Klein, the reason why this method is necessary is that it is not feasible to have such policies 
implemented through democracy. The Shock Doctrine is one of the richest texts I have found 
when it comes to utilizing religious metaphors for the business of economics. She uses 
numerous comparisons of economists with various types of priests, or schools of economic 
thought with churches (Klein 2007:61, 49). In Klein’s narrative, Milton Friedman takes the 
role of the “preacher” or “prophet” (ibid:6, 18), while the Chicago school of economics that 
he is closely tied to has “sacred Chicago teachings”, and consists of “true believers” (ibid:50, 
51).  
Wendy Brown, a critical voice from the political left in American academia, has written about 
the phenomenon of neoliberalism at length, and describes it as part of the “religious-political 
project” of the American political neoconservativism (Brown 2003:1). While she does not 
explicitly use other religious terms when describing neoliberalism, she still goes on to write 
what can be read, with Luckmann and Nelson’s definitions in the back of our heads, as a 
theological analysis of neoliberalism and a critique of its faith and ritual. In her article Neo-
liberalism and the End of Liberal Democracy, she describes neoliberalism as “not simply a set 
of economic policies”, but something which “reaches from the soul of the citizen-subject to 
education policy to practices of empire” (ibid: 7). Such an all-encompassing force in society 
seems comparable to the role of Christian religion in medieval Europe.  
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A very current example is Thomas Piketty. His book Capital in the Twenty-first Century has 
been enormously successful and has spurned renewed interest in macro-economics around the 
world. He is deeply critical of the economic field, and writes that “the discipline of economics 
has yet to get over its childish passion for mathematics and for purely theoretical and often 
highly ideological speculation, at the expense of historical research and collaboration with the 
other social sciences” (Piketty 2014:31). While he does not explicitly use the word religion 
here, it is clear that he has many of the same objections to the field of economics that has 
caused Nelson and others to do so. He is arguing that the ideological basis which economics 
rests upon has caused its scientific legitimacy to falter. In other parts of his texts, he comes 
even closer to comparing economy to religion, when he writes of economists’ “excessive 
fondness for fairy tales” (ibid:11) or asks the question “Can we be sure that an economy based 
on the ‘free market’ and private property always and everywhere leads to an optimal division, 
as if by magic?” (ibid:41). Piketty points out that economists take their theoretical 
understanding of the world from some otherworldly understanding of how things are 
“supposed” to work. Even though he might not conclude that it is similar to a religion, using 
Luckmann’s definition, or Nelson’s, one certainly could. 
Other authors who compare religion to economy even more explicitly, include Gilbert Rist 
(2011:157), who in a chapter called Economic “Science” as Religion argues that “economics 
has captured the former space of religion, by claiming to define the norms (or constraints) that 
society must obey”. S.J. Pack (1991:168), writes about Capitalism as a Moral System, coming 
quite close to the phenomenological definition Luckmann uses on religion. 
Contemporaries of Naomi Klein or Wendy Brown in Norway are people like Erik S. Reinert 
and Bent S. Tranøy. They both write within a tradition of political left-side criticism of 
economy: they are critical of the market and they use religious metaphors to get their points 
across. As an example, Reinert (2009:13) writes that “our own prosperity is threatened by the 
fact that “the market” has been upgraded from a tool to a religion”. Tranøy has a different 
twist on the comparison, with his claims that a better term for “neoliberal” is “market 
fundamentalist”. He explains that these are people who have “seen the light” of the market, 
and believe it has shown them absolute truth. They see the “untarnished market” as the only 
way to our “salvation” (Tranøy 2007:9-11). Tranøy describes neoliberals as subscribing to 
chauvinistic, reductionist, naturalistic, populist and imperialistic ideas of circular 
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righteousness. They have selfishness as their driving force, are anti-scientific and are driven 
by an urge to spread their ideas (ibid: 11).  
5.5.2 Neoliberal Missionaries 
One area of economics where the comparisons and connections to religion seem to be 
especially prevalent is in criticism of global developmental politics, and especially the 
international financial institutions. The following narratives are examples of this. There is a 
lot of “political pressure from the World Bank and the IMF to favor capitalist interests” 
(Fligstein 2001:299), but many argue that it does not seem clear that this leads to development 
for poor countries. One way to look at it, says Nelson (2001:262), is that foreign economists 
in places like Africa are equivalent to a missionary society. Joseph Stiglitz (cited in Evans and 
Sewell 2013:45) agrees, and has called both the IMF and the World Bank “missionary 
institutions” for neoliberalism. 
While the source of modern free-market capitalism is the western world, first and foremost 
represented by the United States, Graham Harrison (2010:4) argues that “Africa is at the 
forefront of a globalized project of neoliberal reform (and) provides vital insights and lessons 
(most of them cautionary) for the rest of the world”. Here, the missionaries are implementing 
their “adjustments” and sharing their wisdom of the market. The new virtues of the market 
will, according to the neoliberal theology, rinse out the “sinful past of Africa”, and the 
assumption of an “inherent right and duty to change the world”, gives the World Bank the 
self-legitimation needed to push it through (Mihevc 1995:25). 
Many current professional economists working in Africa and other “less developed” parts of the world 
are engaged in efforts that in practice go well beyond teaching the technical aspects of economics. In 
order for these countries to develop economically, they will need not only a better banking system but 
also a “better” value system (…) The processes of economic development may, in short, require 
proselytizing and religious conversion (…) Economists may have to be priests as much as engineers 
(Nelson 2001: 262-263). 
Naomi Klein cites one of the main actors of the Chicago School, Arnold Harberger, 
describing himself as “a seriously dedicated missionary” (Klein 2007:61). Economists acting 
as missionaries is the basic premise of Elisabeth Ocampo and Den Neu’s book Doing 
Missionary Work – The World Bank and the Diffusion of Financial Practices. In that book, 
they describe the religious character of the World Bank’s work in the following way:  
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The World Bank uses prescribed mechanisms, attached to loan agreements, to facilitate its economic 
agendas. These mechanisms can be compared to the vestments and rituals that are part of the high mass 
or other sacraments in the church. In the case of loans, the priests of the World Bank bring with them 
key practices that define economic responsibility – in the same seamless way that specific rituals define 
what it means to be a practicing member of a congregation.  The authenticity of these practices – 
accountability mechanisms, the regulated publication of reports, incentive mechanisms, performance 
indicators, technical assistance programs, external consultative imperatives - are not to be questioned 
by the congregation. (Ocampo and Neu 2008:10) 
This gives us an image of international economy as an arena for cultural imperialism and 
coercion. The comparison with religion makes the point very clear, though it is hard to say 
what definition of religion for example Ocampo and Neu base their comparison on. 
Even though development policy is usually thought of as politics of solidarity, with the 
common good of mankind as the stated goal, it seems that many strategies lead to growing 
wealth for the West, and a tragic status quo for the Rest. One could ask: is it not only logical 
that profit and solidarity is contradictory, and that to really help the poorer parts of the world, 
the rich countries might have to make some real sacrifices? According to Sung (1999:55-56), 
the answer to this is “Not for someone who has faith in the market (…) The ‘magic’ which 
can turn ‘egoism’ into solidarity will be born from ‘the invisible hand of the market’”. 
5.5.3 Comparison of Nelson and the Critics of Neoliberalism 
The narratives outlined here are, just as the ones mentioned in the introduction, are widely 
different from one another, and can not be seen as unified. Their conceptions of religion and 
their comparisons between religion and economy are very dissimilar, and they all have 
different goals in using such comparisons. Those who criticize neoliberalism also all differ 
from Nelson in some important respects, the first of which is that they are only talking about 
one specific form of capitalistic economy. Many of them might disagree with Nelson’s 
analysis, which categorizes all of the major modern economic ideologies as different forms of 
religion. In fact, many of them seem to implicitly support a return to the progressive 
economics of Keynes, which Nelson labels as one of the most important economic religions 
of western history. They also all seem to use the religious comparison as insults. They are 
using religion as a rhetorical concept to imply lack of scientific legitimacy, or belief in 
inexplicable doctrines that are contrary to common sense or good morals. 
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Where Nelson paints an image of economists as different priesthoods all seeking a salvation 
through the eradication of poverty in different ways, the critics of neoliberalism describe only 
false prophets. Nelson depicts the progressive movement as believers in one way of achieving 
heaven on earth, through controlling the economy, and the Chicago school as another 
movement of believers who differ in understanding of the correct path to salvation. The critics 
of neoliberalism seem to see only the Chicago school as priesthood, while the progressives 
who came before them were seemingly simply economists. 
In sum, most other authors who compare economy and religion do not provide the same 
insight as Nelson, and do not work as well with the sociological theory of Luckmann. First of 
all, they do not explore their own comparison theoretically at any great length. Second, they 
focus on specific forms of economy, like neoliberal capitalism. And third, they have a clear 
critical agenda. They are using the label as a rhetorical tool and a strategy of ridicule. This 
makes them very different from Nelson. They are not inviting to a debate where the religious 
character of economic ideologies are openly discussed and accepted, like Nelson seems to 
intend. Instead, they are using the religious label as a way of shutting certain elements out of 
the discussion altogether. 
5.6 Morality in Economy 
One of the biggest values in Nelson’s project may be that he shows us how deep the 
ideological roots of economics go. By seeing the religious nature of economics, we see the 
fundamentally moral basis for its construction. Economists, according to Nelson (1991:15) 
“have a major input not only in matters of material production but in shaping ethical 
character”. And for these economists, “Rationality” has become a “term of moral approval” 
(ibid:7). Nelson explains that “Economics has never been, nor could it ever be, free of value 
judgments”. In the past, economists like Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill regarded 
themselves as “moral philosophers”, but today, “the powerful normative elements of 
economics tend to be driven underground”. Thus, the economists of modern day are only 
“implicit moral philosophers” (Nelson 2013:38). While the moral nature of the economy has 
become more and more hidden, the power and scope of economic religion in society has only 
grown, and without the moral underpinnings it is built on, it would not have nearly the same 
impact it has today. 
 65 
 
 
Without religion’s moral energy, without a certain fanatic devotion to a cause, there might be little 
movement in the American political system. So, we might applaud the rise of environmental religion as 
a sign of the great vitality of American religion today. After all, the political energies aroused by 
environmental religion have contributed significantly to improving air quality, reducing water 
pollution, protecting our forests, controlling toxic waste, and any number of other environmental gains 
over the past few decades. There is, however, also a significant negative side to the power of 
environmental religion. There are a number of irrational aspects to environmental policy making in the 
United States, with the environmental crusade often stirring strong reactions against the “evils” of 
economic and technological progress, and offering fantastic images of a mythological American 
“wilderness” (Nelson 2004:78). 
In other words, the religious “content” or characteristics of economy or environmentalism can 
have both negative and positive consequences. It can cause much needed enthusiasm and 
vigor, but it can also lead to decisions that are not logical outside of the religious mindset. 
Others have also focused on the deeply moral foundations of modern economy, and while 
they do not explicitly use religious comparisons, I still want to mention some who show very 
aptly how economy and ethics can never be separated, because they also seem to fit into the 
theoretical perspective I have presented in this thesis. Marion Fourcade and Kieran Healy 
(2007) have written the article Moral Views of Market Society on the moral characteristics of 
markets where they explain that historically, several different relationships to morality have 
been attributed to markets. By some, they are seen as good or civilizing, what Fourcade and 
Healy call “the Liberal Dream”. Then there are the critics, often basing their arguments on a 
Marxist tradition or logic, who claim that markets undermine the morality of society, and are 
fundamentally destructive. They call this “the Commodified Nightmare”. The third category 
is what they see as the mainstream consensus in economic sociology, what they call “Feeble 
Markets”. The idea of feeble markets is that markets are not the powerful moral influences 
assumed by the other two views.  
Fourcade and Healy contribute to the three types of interpretation of morality and markets 
with a fourth approach, where they emphasize the powerful but subjective and relative 
morality of markets: “markets are culture, not just because they are the products of human 
practices and sense making, but because markets are explicitly moral projects, saturated with 
normativity” (Fourcade and Healy 2007:299-300). The “feeble markets” stance fails to 
recognize the moral power of markets, while the “civilizing markets” and “destructive 
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markets” views are both subjective interpretations which fail to recognize the cultural 
relativity of morality. 
Morality does not refer here to some universal ethical standard; rather, it means what a society, or a 
group, defines as good or bad, legitimate or appropriate. The moral valuation or appropriate 
classification of particular goods, or even of the market itself, is therefore not fixed but empirically 
variable (ibid:301) 
Clearly, when Fourcade and Healy here refer to markets as culture, the implicit logic is the 
same as what I have been explaining in this whole text, based on Luckmann’s definition of 
religious symbolic universes and Nelson’s understanding of economics. Markets can be both 
good and bad, but that depends on the eye of the beholder, just as we would accept the 
different understandings of moral right and wrong in various traditional religions. Different 
religions, or groupings within the same religion, have different norms. What is morally 
acceptable in one religion may be condemned by another, but it is hard to deny that religion is 
in many ways connected to people’s view of morals. Neither markets nor traditional religions 
are either innately morally good or immoral, because morality has no fixed answers, it is 
subjective. But markets, traditional religions and Nelson’s secular economic religions are all 
explicitly moral projects: they claim moral authority, and it is up to the observer to decide if 
one agrees or disagrees with that claim. In line with the socially constructed nature of 
markets, the morality intertwined in them is also presented as an objective reality, despite its 
fundamentally subjective nature. In most economic religions, the innate goodness and divine 
morality of markets are taken as given.  
This has clear consequences for society: when markets are understood as moral projects, we 
need to evaluate whether or not we think that they are positive or negative. It is not likely that 
we can reach a consensus, or that we will ever find a clear answer as to the nature of the 
morality of all markets, but we should at the very least recognize the moral power that 
markets have. They influence human lives on a daily basis, in many cases in ways that are 
relevant to our moral outlook and ethical considerations. The morality of some markets has 
gotten more attention than others as of late, such as clothes manufacturing and certain types of 
petroleum-extraction. Markets for agricultural products also have enormous moral 
implications. Claiming that markets are not moral in nature makes very little sense in light of 
these cases. 
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6 Conclusions 
This thesis has tried to identify the sociological usefulness of comparing economy to religion. 
Concluding here, after the discussion of the morality of markets, is a fitting way to arrive at 
the end of this mission. Economy influences individuals in ways that are very often not 
considered in everyday life. While everyone is influenced by the economic norms that 
characterize our societies, it is very seldom that we think about just how much economic 
ideologies influence our morality. The ideas that I have discussed in this thesis give us some 
different perspectives on precisely this. 
The term religion is shunned by many, as we have seen in this text. But at its core, it is simply 
a word that describes a certain way of understanding the world. In Luckmann’s thinking it is a 
symbolic universe, a cosmos of meaning. It gives us a hierarchy of ultimate significance in 
life. Frames of reference into which we build for example our conceptions of morality. Nelson 
claims that economics fits into such a concept. In this thesis, I have tried to expand his 
“economics as religion” to “economy as religion” by thinking sociologically. I think it has 
demonstrated that such a comparison is very much a sociologically useful endeavor.  
The comparison between economy and religion is meant as a tool for understanding. 
Sociology attempts to understand the relationship between individuals and society, and 
between objective and subjective reality. If the nature of this relationship takes the shape of 
what we call religion, then it is useful to call it that. The understanding of economy as religion 
can qualitatively alter our perception of society and our diagnosis of modernity. As an 
example, Nelson’s description of environmentalism and economics as two religions in a moral 
conflict gives us a perspective that can be intellectually and analytically fruitful. 
In a way, what I have done is to explore how Nelson’s most important ideas can be 
understood in the light of the sociology of Thomas Luckmann. And not only does Nelson’s 
idea of economics as religion gain something by being looked at through the 
phenomenological sociology of Luckmann, but Luckmann’s ideas can also gain something 
from being applied to Nelson’s ideas. To me the two sets of ideas are mutually beneficial to 
one another and both can work as an expansion of the other. 
Comparing economy to religion shows us a lot about the social nature of economy. The veil 
of scientism that usually envelops economics can be lifted, and we can see through the 
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positivistic illusions that many economists base their analyses on. The subjective nature of the 
socially constructed economic cosmos is revealed. Using phenomenological thinking and 
social constructivism, it is possible to understand economy from an outside perspective, 
giving us perspectives that are very different than the inside perspective of the field of 
economics. The moral assumptions that form the basis of different economic philosophies 
seem to be invisible to many of the economists who act within their symbolic universes. As 
sociologists, we are afforded the luxury of seeing just how strongly the economic cosmos 
influences how the economic field and the whole of the economy works in modern societies. 
This thesis has been theoretical, and I have made no attempt at using empirically the theories I 
have analyzed in this text. However, I see no reason why one could not do so. A sociological 
analysis of any economic movement or ideology should be entirely possible. One would 
"simply" treat the economic religion as any other religion, and use the methods and theory of 
sociology to explore its social implications. It would be very interesting to see how well 
economists or students of economy would fit into the assumptions made by Nelson in an 
interview setting. I imagine one maybe would have to avoid religiously loaded words like 
"transcendence" or “salvation” when discussing economic ideology, but other words with 
merely implicit religious content might work better, such as "ultimate values" or “utopia”.  
Even if one was to discard the notion that economy fulfills the functions needed to call it a 
religion, based on disagreement about either how religion or economy has been defined in this 
thesis, I still would argue that it is a useful sociological idea. Even though one can think of 
other ways to understand economy, the concept of economy as religion gives us a useful 
entrance into thinking about the connections between economic theory and social moral 
ideologies, and a deeper explanation of the discrepancies between scientific demands and 
economic performance.  
I have also spotlighted some potentially big problems of the comparison between economy 
and religion in this thesis. While it may offer valuable insight from a theoretical sociological 
perspective, the religious label might also cause debate to stagnate completely as economists 
and others refuse to engage with the notion that their thinking is anything but scientific. It 
may also be possible that after the initial fascination over economy’s many similarities with 
religion, one finds that it offers little in the way of meaningful understanding, even for 
sociologists such as myself. For now, I am still positive about the potential in this perspective. 
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These are exciting times for discussing economy. Not only has Piketty sparked a huge debate 
both within and outside of the economic profession about inequality. Naomi Klein just 
published her long-awaited follow-up to The Shock Doctrine, called This Changes Everything, 
this time examining the “battle of worldviews” (Klein 2014:58) between capitalist economics 
and environmental concerns. In Norway, Erik Dammann (2014) has recently published a 
similar book, calling for a “revolution of values”. Nelson saw these conflicts as religious in 
the New Holy Wars. It remains to be seen how large a part religious comparisons will play in 
the mainstream public debates spurred by for example these books and their underlying social 
issues. 
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